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This thesis investigates the significance of U.S. military aviation mishaps in 
Japan. Such accidents routinely create political controversy in Okinawa, but some 
incidents draw more attention or ridicule than others. This study evaluates the conditions 
that shape the variation in how damaging aviation mishaps are to the maintenance of 
American bases, which are crucial to American regional strategy. Using qualitative 
methods, this research analyzes five U.S. military crashes in Okinawa: the 2004 CH-53 
crash at Okinawa International University, the 2013 HH-60 Air Force crash near Camp 
Hansen, the 1988 CH-46 crash in Kunigami, the 1992 CH-46 crash at Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Futenma, and the 1959 F-100D crash at Miyamori Primary School. This 
study concludes that the four most significant crash factors in Okinawa are whether a 
crash occurred in a township, whether civilian fatalities/injuries were involved, whether 
there was a cluster of recent U.S. military accidents, and whether American post-crash 
public relations was poor. An accident involving MCAS Futenma or the U.S. Marines 
will be more highly politicized. Thus, a Futenma-based aircraft crashing into the 
township and killing civilians represents a worst-case scenario. Three crash factors that 
the U.S. military has the ability to influence are post-crash public relations, crash-site 
management, and local interagency cooperation. 
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Despite political controversy over U.S. bases in Japan, the American presence in 
the island country has proven its strategic advantages for the United States. Totaling 
almost 90 military installations from the 1950s to the 1970s, the U.S. presence in Japan 
was critical during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.1 With a decreased security threat in 
Europe, the Obama administration made plans in 2012 to reduce overseas troops in Italy 
and Germany while the troops in Northeast Asia have not been reduced. The United 
States has been challenged by the logistical demands of fighting two wars and maintains 
nearly 900 military installations in 45 countries.2 American overseas bases—in Japan and 
elsewhere—have been labeled “embattled garrisons,” strategically valuable but 
politically vulnerable.3 The United States needs Japan to remain committed to supporting 
American basing strategy in Asia. However, the American military presence in Japan, 
and specifically in Okinawa, is undermined by a contentious history, an anti-military 
culture, and animosity in the Okinawa-Tokyo-Washington relationship. Due to these 
factors, there is a high level of general tension between the Okinawans and the American 
forces. 
U.S. military accidents create various levels of political controversy. American 
incidents are politicized in Okinawa to different degrees, shaping election results and 
policy decisions, and Okinawan media and political activists play a significant role in 
crafting public opinion. While uproar over one U.S. military aviation crash might 
dissipate in a few days, another crash could become a cataclysmic event, leading to 
unprecedented levels of protest and politicization, potentially affecting U.S.-Japan basing 
agreements. Using qualitative methods to assess why certain aviation accidents have been 
                                                 
1 John Feffer, “Pacific Pushback: Can Japan Say No to Washington?” (JPRI Working Paper No. 116, 
Japan Policy Research Institute, Oakland, CA, March 2010), 1. 
2 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in 
Contentious Politics, 2011), 3. 
3 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 9. 
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more politicized than others, this research analyzes selected U.S. military crashes in 
Okinawa. The analysis identifies factors characteristic of politically contentious crashes. 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Answering the question of why some aviation accidents are more politicized than 
others requires further analysis of the underlying factors associated with aviation 
accidents and weighing those features against each other. An example of such a crash 
factor is crash-site location; a crash-site on base property is generally less controversial, 
leading to less politicization than a crash that occurs in the township. Through this 
analysis, this research identifies which factors are most susceptible to politicization and 
which factors the American military presence has the ability to influence. The goal is to 
gain understanding that may aid in predicting the consequences of potential future 
scenarios. 
After reviewing the case studies, this study concludes that the four most 
significant crash factors in Okinawa are  
 whether a crash site occurred in a township,  
 whether civilian fatalities/injuries were involved, 
 whether there was a cluster of recent U.S. military accidents, and  
 whether American post-crash public relations was poor.  
It should also be noted that an accident involving Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma or the U.S. Marine Corps will be more highly politicized than a crash 
involving a different American base or service. Thus, a Futenma-based aircraft crashing 
into the township and killing civilians represents a worst-case scenario for the American 
basing presence. The three crash factors that the U.S. military has the ability to influence 
are post-crash public relations, crash-site management, and local interagency cooperation. 
If the goal is to stabilize base relations in Okinawa, then American military forces need to 
prioritize effective public relations campaigns and interagency operations with local 
authorities. 
 3 
This research presents five American aviation mishaps in detail: the August 2004 
CH-53 crash at Okinawa International University, the August 2013 HH-60 Air Force 
crash on base near Camp Hansen, the 1988 CH-46 crash in Kunigami, the 1992 CH-46 
crash at Futenma, and finally the 1959 F-100D crash at Miyamori Primary School. These 
accidents created a variety of political tension and involved a wide array of differently 
weighted factors. For each crash, a study is conducted of the drivers, local citizens’ 
response, and the aftermath of each mishap. Consideration is given to Okinawan public 
opinion, the political positions of politicians, the ramifications of their political decisions, 
and voting results. Okinawan external threats are reviewed and considered against the 
aftermath of aviation crashes (i.e., is the politicization of a crash different when it occurs 
following a recent North Korean missile launch). For the purposes of this study, the 
dependent variable is Okinawan political controversy. This research relies upon first-
hand accounts of crashes, government statements, U.S. military press releases, military 
documents, and scholarly accounts. Election results are evaluated alongside political 
speeches, local newspaper reports, and magazine articles. 
In order to analyze the individual factors associated with the crashes, case study 
analyses are conducted in pairs. The Futenma-based 2004 CH-53D accident at Okinawa 
University will be introduced first because it was a highly politicized crash in the 
township, characterized by poor interagency cooperation, poor U.S. Marine public 
relations, environmental concerns, and controversy over crash site management. 
Providing major contrasts, the minimally politicized 2013 Air Force HH-60 accident took 
place on U.S. base property, included a U.S. serviceman fatality, and represented 
effective interagency cooperation and post-crash public relations. 
Following that analysis, the highly politicized 1988 CH-46 crash at Kunigami will 
be evaluated, an event that led to four U.S. servicemen deaths and occurred when the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was struggling politically. This 1988 accident added to a 
rash of American accidents and compelled Tokyo’s elites to make a political concession 
that Washington opposed. For comparison purposes, the moderately politicized 1992 CH-
46 crash was selected because it took place after the Cold War, there were no fatalities, 
and there was an anti-base governor in office. 
 4 
The final case study, the pre-reversion, 1959 F-100 Miyamori crash, will be 
reviewed individually. This accident was selected because it represents a worst-case 
scenario: the death of children and other civilians. A crash of this magnitude today would 
likely advance unforeseen levels of politicization. 
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
To limit the scope of this thesis, certain questions are not evaluated by this 
research. The goal is not to prove or defend the relative impact of crashes, but to assess 
why there is variation between their impacts. Additionally, while aviation accidents are 
not the only events capable of generating political controversy (others include crime, 
other military accidents, and environmental damage), this research will not investigate 
the relationship between crashes and other catalytic incidents.4 Finally, due to time 
constraints, this study concentrates on five selected aviation mishaps so that crash-related 
factors can be compared and contrasted. While one crash took place in the 1950s, the 
other crashes occurred within the past three decades. Over the past half-century, 
Okinawan political activists have improved their organization, and accidents that are 
more recent are more relevant to predicting the consequences of a future crash. 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To address the reasons for tensions on Okinawa, Chapter II provides a historical 
summary, an overview of contemporary Okinawan base politics, and a literature review 
of the subject. Chapter III provides an overview of two opposing forces: Okinawan 
political movements and Tokyo’s tool of compensation politics. It also underlines the 
impotence of Okinawan local government relative to Tokyo’s national power and strong 
pro-American security consensus. Chapter IV delivers case study analyses, comparing 
and contrasting a variety of factors associated with aviation crashes. A review of five 
case studies evaluates the circumstances, politicization, and aftermath of each event. The 
chapter concludes by identifying the factors are most susceptible to politicization and 
                                                 
4 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 86–87. 
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which factors the American military presence has the ability to influence. Chapter V 
summarizes the results of the study and provides a reflection on contemporary Okinawa. 
  
 6 
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II. OKINAWA BASE CONSERVATION AND CONTROVERSY 
With the goal of providing a baseline understanding of the general tension 
between Okinawans and the U.S. military basing presence, this chapter highlights 
historical issues and contemporary concerns. It introduces the American basing presence, 
Okinawa’s distinct culture, and the complicated trilateral relationship between Tokyo, 
Washington, and Okinawa. Next, a literature review highlights the scholarship pertaining 
to contentious American basing issues. Contemporary external threats and basing issues 
are catalogued, including debate over Futenma, its continued operation, and the 
controversy over its potential relocation. The legitimacy of the sustained 70-year 
American basing presence is examined and various arguments are presented. American 
basing externalities like service-member crime, accidents, and pollution are introduced to 
provide an understanding of the negative aspects of the U.S. presence. 
A. CONTEMPORARY OKINAWAN HISTORY 
Located approximately 400 miles south of mainland Japan, Okinawa is the largest 
island in the Ryukyu Island chain. In the 17th century, Okinawa served as tributary state 
to both China and Japan. Commerce brought additional influences to the island, helping 
to shape a distinct Okinawan culture. The local residents traditionally spoke Okinawan, 
until the Japanese annexed the island in 1879 and the local populace was forced to speak 
Japanese. Since the arrival of the Japanese in the 1870s, control over Okinawa has been 
tenuous. The Japanese controlled the island and enforced their will on the populace until 
the end of World War Two. To this day, the local population identifies itself first as 
Okinawan, and not Japanese. 
The bloody 1945 battle for Okinawa scarred the local residents, killing one-third 
of the native population.5 The Okinawans were caught in a disadvantageous position 
between the attacking Americans and the retrenched Japanese. In what was termed the 
“typhoon of steel,” American naval and air forces bombarded the island with over 
                                                 
5 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 2008), 140. 
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120,000 tons of ammunition.6 During a brutal three month onslaught, the island was 
devastated by the effects of war as the Japanese 32
nd
 Army, and its 110,000 men, were 
defeated by the Americans; included in the death toll of combatants were approximately 
65,000 Japanese soldiers, 12,500 Americans, and 28,000 Okinawan recruits.7 Estimates 
vary on how many Okinawan non-combatants were killed by American fire or Japanese 
fire, but the fighting contributed to the long-term bitterness of Okinawans toward the 
Japanese, the Americans, and to the institution of war. The U.S. Marines, in particular, 
played a major role in the battle for Okinawa, contributing to a contentious present-day 
relationship between the Marine Corps and the local populace. 
In the early 1950s, U.S. and Japanese leaders negotiated the permanent 
establishment of American bases in Japan. After defeating Imperial Japan in 1945, the 
United States had an initial goal of a “liberating occupation” with the intent to “occupy 
briefly, transform local politics in Wilsonian fashion, and then depart.”8 The years 
immediately following World War Two were dedicated to the considerable task of 
rebuilding and regrouping war-torn Japan. In 1947, a new Japanese Constitution was 
enacted, which included a ninth article that forever renounced Japan’s ability to wage war 
against other states as a means of resolving conflict. With the outbreak of the Korean War 
in 1950, however, American leadership actively pursued a policy of rearming Japan as a 
Cold War ally. Even though the Japanese constitution forbade a military, General 
Douglas MacArthur ordered Japan to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve 
(NPR).9 Not labeled a military, the NPR possessed tanks, artillery, and guns; adding to 
the controversy, former Imperial Army officers rose to leadership positions. The 
Americans intended to eventually develop the NPR into an official Japanese military, but 
Japanese leadership had other plans.10 
                                                 
6 Kensei Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. Occupation (Bellingham, WA: Western 
Washington Univ., Center for East Asian Studies, 2002), xxxii. 
7 Ibid., 1, 3. 
8 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 109. 
9 Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2005), 206. 
10 Ibid. 
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In September 1951, Japan finally officially regained its sovereignty when 
Washington and Tokyo signed an official World War Two peace treaty. In an attempt to 
avoid military rearmament, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru struck a balance with the 
U.S. in which permanent American bases were permitted in exchange for Japanese 
sovereignty.11 Known as the Yoshida Doctrine, the Americans agreed to provide security 
for Japan while the Japanese focused on economic development. The Americans were 
permitted to maintain bases indefinitely in Japan in order to maintain Far East security; 
the U.S. could project force from these bases without the permission of Japan and could 
refuse basing rights to any other country. This agreement benefitted Japan because they 
could ignore the burdens of building a normal military and the partnership proved 
effective well into the 21st century. Yoshida opposed revising Article 9 because the 
Japanese lacked an appetite for war and rearmament would have worsened relations with 
Asian neighbors.12 Subsequently, Japan was able to embrace a pacifist culture and 
nationalize its efforts toward unprecedented economic success. 
In 1952, Yoshida explained to the Diet that Article 9 could be revised following 
economic success and increased trust with Japan’s neighbors.13 In a compromise with the 
Americans, Japan created a Self Defense Force (SDF) two years later. Following the 
establishment of SDF air and maritime units, Japan committed to annual military 
expenditures, and domestic industry began producing tanks, aircraft, and ships. Even 
though the SDF increased in size during the Cold War, Japan was content to rely on the 
Americans for national security and unchallenged basing rights. In spite of numerous 
basing challenges since 1945, Tokyo and Washington have cooperated to preserve a 
durable existence for American forces in Japan. The U.S. heavily depended on its 
Japanese bases to support demanding wars in Korea and Vietnam. Additionally, the 
Americans maintained an East Asian security presence throughout the Cold War and well 
into the 21st Century. 
                                                 
11 Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children, 207. 
12 Ibid., 205. 
13 Ibid., 210. 
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Starting in the 1950s, Japan’s national economy soared to unforeseen heights. In 
what was termed “the Japanese miracle,” Japan developed an economy that rose to 
become the second largest in the world during the 1980s. Japan’s Liberal Democratic 
Party maintained a stranglehold on Tokyo’s national political power throughout the three-
plus decades of Japan’s economic boom. The LDP remained steadfastly committed to 
supporting the Yoshida Doctrine and the permanent American basing presence. Near the 
end of the Cold War, Japan experienced an economic recession that plagued the island 
nation throughout the 1990s. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Tokyo remained committed to maintaining an 
American troop presence amidst new external security concerns including China’s rise, 
conflict over the Senkakus, and the North Korean nuclear threat. During the North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1994, Tokyo increased contributions to American bases in 
Japan by 5.4 percent.14 The United States aims to build regional relationships in an effort 
to multilaterally defend against a regional power transition and guard against future 
contingencies. Though Japan has developed one of the top militaries in the world despite 
constitutional limitations, Japan also currently provides a highly supportive environment 
for American bases there, including spending more than four billion dollars annually to 
support them.15 
  
                                                 
14 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 198. 
15 Feffer, “Pacific Pushback,” 1. 
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Figure 1.  Okinawa, Japan 
 
Adapted from Google Maps. “Okinawa, Japan,” n.d., http://www.google.com/maps/@ 
32.0372172,130.8502579,5z. 
B. OKINAWAN BASE POLITICS AND MCAS FUTENMA’S FUTURE 
In large part due to the 70 years of continued American presence, tenuous 
political relations remain between Okinawa and Tokyo. Okinawans activists are fixated 
on the presence of American bases, politicizing incidents and accidents. American bases 
are situated on Okinawan land that was almost entirely taken from private citizens within 
15 years of Japan’s surrender.16 Conservatives in the Japanese government view 
American bases in Okinawa as honoring the security agreement between the two nations, 
while reformists see an illegitimate occupation. In 1972, amid Okinawan protests against 
American control reaching unmanageable levels during the Vietnam War, the U.S. 
returned control of the island to Japan. Located nearly 1000 miles away, Tokyo replaced 
Washington as the overall authority over Okinawa. 
                                                 
16 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Holt, 
2000), 51. 
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More than half of the nearly 50,000 American troops in Japan are Okinawa-based, 
assigned to 32 American installations on the island.17 A politically contentious base, 
Futenma is located in highly populated Ginowan, only five miles from Okinawa’s capital 
city of Naha. Futenma averaged 142 military aircraft takeoffs each day in the late 
1990s.18 Although the U.S. Air Force’s Kadena is the largest military installation on the 
island, it draws considerably less political attention than Futenma. Numerous U.S. 
military incidents in Okinawa have victimized foreign civilians. Okinawan aviation 
accidents will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Figure 2.  Okinawa Prefectural Government 
 
Source: “Okinawa Prefectural Government,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, n.d., 
http://www.japanfocus.org/data/okinawa_prefectural_government.png. 
The most politicized American controversy since Okinawa’s reversion, the 
September 1995 rape of an Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen led to an agreement 
                                                 
17 Associated Press, “U.S. Military Helicopter Crew Survives Crash on Okinawa,” Guardian, August 
5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/us-military-helicopter-crash-okinawa. 
18 Johnson, Blowback, 47. 
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to permanently close the Marines’ base at Futenma. Since the preliminary agreement in 
1996, the goal of the Futenma plan was to close the base between 2001 and 2003.19 By 
2006, an agreement was reached to close Futenma, build a new Marine base in Nago, and 
transfer 8,000 Marines to Guam (with Tokyo paying six-billion dollars in relocation 
costs).20 In the 2006 election for Okinawa’s governor, the LDP-backed candidate 
defeated the socialist, anti-base candidate by a five percent margin.21 This election was 
significant because it illuminated the economic impact of the American basing presence 
in Okinawa; Tokyo’s provision of economic incentives proved stronger than anti-base 
sentiment. Although Tokyo had earmarked funds for the relocation of Futenma’s move to 
Nago, by 2007, the new governor cancelled the plan and Tokyo increased local 
community payments.22 
In Okinawa, local media outlets and newspapers have remained anti-base 
throughout the years, politicizing controversial events and using anti-base rhetoric. The 
media and anti-base political activists are quick to seize any opportunity to politicize both 
the American base presence and American military safety record. Even an American 
helicopter crash in the Middle East or a V-22 Osprey wreck in the Hawaii is liable to 
make the local Okinawan news. The anti-base contingent seeks to keep the spotlight on 
local and international American operations. 
Even though Japanese citizens have witnessed increased security concerns, not-in-
my-backyard politics remain pervasive throughout Japan. The political fallout over 
gaining approval for a new Marine Henoko facility near Nago has crippled the plans for 
closing Futenma. Okinawan local government was able to block Henoko construction 
efforts for 18 years from 1996 through July 2014. Ultimately, Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s government overpowered opposition from Governor Takeshi Onaga and other 
political activists. Construction began in July 2014, but after issues with protesters, 
                                                 
19 Mike Mochizuki, “U.S.-Japan Agreement on Okinawa Is Not a Breakthrough,” Dispatch Japan, 
April 11, 2013, 1. 
20 Feffer, “Pacific Pushback,” 2. 
21 Cooley, Base Politics, 158. 
22 Ibid., 159. 
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weather, and election considerations, assembly was suspended by November.23 
Construction at Henoko has been further convoluted by environmental considerations 
over “half of one of Japan’s most precious nature zones” full of biological diversity and 
rare marine life like the endangered sea mammal, the dugong.24 The 2014 reelection of 
anti-base Nago City Mayor Susumu Imamine complicated Henoko construction, proving 
how resolute the local residents are in their opposition to the construction project. An 
August 2014 Pentagon announcement described Futenma remaining operational until at 
least 2023 or maybe until 2029.25 Today, Futenma represents a microcosm of the 
American basing arrangement as local activists seek to close the base while Tokyo and 
Washington collaborate for its relocation on the island. Abe’s insistence on maintaining 
U.S. bases in Okinawa is contrasted by a divided Okinawan public. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section introduces contemporary debate over the American basing presence 
in Okinawa including the effects of crime, accidents, and pollution. First, an historical 
review of Okinawan basing issues is provided with a focus on the highly contentious base 
at Futenma and dispute over its replacement facility. Second, arguments from scholars 
will highlight differing opinions over the legitimacy of the American base presence in 
Japan, American foreign policy, external security threats, and the strategic value of 
Okinawan bases. 
1. Historical Review 
According to Kent Calder, geography is a significant driver for relations between 
the American forces and the local residents because increased contact (and closer 
proximity for bases to urban zones) leads to greater friction.26 Futenma was built in 1945 
and Ginowan city has encroached on the base through the years by building closer and 
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closer to the base’s fence-line, including Okinawa International University, constructed in 
1972. Thus, Ginowan’s high population density around Futenma has exacerbated 
relations with the U.S. Marine Corps. Mike Mochizuki classifies both the problematic 
nature of Futenma’s urban location, its political significance, and heightened tensions 
following this 2004 crash: “If a tragedy were to occur, this would have a devastating 
effect on the alliance,” and could dramatically impact not just Futenma, but Kadena, as 
well.27 Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye expresses similar concerns about the 
severity of Futenma’s continued operation: “Without some relief for Ginowan, another 
incident could blow things out of proportion and disrupt the alliance.”28 
Base politics are a major driver of Futenma’s future, even though its “actual 
strategic value is, at best, questionable,” says John Feffer.29 Kadena is commonly 
regarded as the more strategically significant base in Okinawa, depressing the value of its 
neighbor. Futenma, however, is a viable divert airfield with 9000 feet of runway and is 
tsunami-protected at 75 meters above sea level.30 In the event of a Korean conflict, 
Futenma also serves as a contingency United Nations Command (Rear) Airfield.31 
Kadena and Futenma cooperate to manage air traffic control, flight sequencing, and 
integrated emergency responses. If Futenma is closed, some analysts believe that the 
concessions will be pocketed and protesters will reorient their attention toward closing 
Kadena. Calder explained in 2007 that it would cost over six billion dollars to move (and 
replace) Kadena and its ammunition supplies from Okinawa.32 
Analysts agree that Tokyo’s current leadership is deeply committed to preserving 
the status quo with American bases. Gavan McCormack concludes that the Tokyo-
Washington-Marines relationship is very strong under Prime Minister Abe. He cautions, 
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however, that forcing the relocation of Futenma to a new construction site near Henoko 
amidst civil opposition risks the removal of all American bases. Critics of the Henoko 
base plan view the project as flawed. Mochizuki cautions Tokyo’s insistence on the 
Henoko relocation plan as potentially weakening, “Okinawan support for more 
strategically critical bases on Okinawa, like Kadena Air Base.”33 McCormack argues that 
Abe has moved Japan closer to integration with American forces for future military 
action by continuing support for U.S. bases in Japan, making plans for establishing the 
Japanese version of the Central Intelligence Agency and Marine Corps, and increasing 
Japanese patriotism.34 McCormack concludes that during national elections in December 
2014, the American basing issue in Okinawa did not register much attention; with 
considerable national support, Abe had a “more-or-less free hand to deploy whatever 
resources of the state he wishes in order to crush opposition and implement his design on 
all fronts.”35 
Robert Eldridge debates Okinawa’s complicated nature: “The ‘base problem’ is 
one of the many strings—the others are economic issues, social issues, historical issues, 
and a host of other problems—making up this knot. If one yanks on the string labeled 
‘base problem,’ the knot will only get tighter.”36 With high levels of general tension 
between the local residents and American forces, Glenn Hook claims that even though 
aviation accidents bear a slight statistical risk of harming Okinawan citizens, it “does not 
represent a low perception of risk for many in Okinawa.”37 
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2. Historical Analysis 
Scholars agree that a high level of general tension exists in Okinawa due to the 
clash of Okinawan culture and the continued operation of U.S. bases. They disagree, 
however, on the legitimacy of sustained American base presence in Japan, the merits of 
the high military presence in Okinawa, and American foreign policy decisions since the 
end of the Cold War. Chalmers Johnson, McCormack, and Feffer are critical of 
America’s motives in Okinawa, questioning the necessity of continued American basing 
at the expense of Okinawans’ democratic rights. On the other side of the issue, Alexander 
Cooley, Mochizuki, and Eldridge view the American basing presence in Okinawan as a 
legitimate, functioning partnership between Japan and the United States. 
Where some analysts see the continued American overseas bases as fostering 
effective security partnerships, others like Johnson equate it to American imperialism. 
Johnson argues that the United States could not have fought wars in Korea and Vietnam 
without Japanese basing-rights; Japan was not asked permission for these bases because 
Tokyo was under American control during the outbreak of the Korean War.38 Instead of 
scaling back in the early 1990s, the United States (in the eyes of Johnson) committed to a 
“global empire,” with foreign bases a leading component of that ambition.39 Feffer 
acknowledges that the U.S. was fortunate during the Cold War to have nearly 90 bases in 
Japan and that “Japan remains the anchor of what’s left of America’s Cold War 
containment policy when it comes to China and North Korea.”40 Those critical of 
American foreign policy equate permanent overseas bases with imperialism. Johnson, for 
example, approached many issues with a critical eye toward American foreign policy and 
many of his points are connected to Okinawan resentment. 
Analyzing Japan among host nations, Cooley and Daniel Nexon argue that 
Japan’s government has had the ability to negotiate grievances and work directly with the 
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Americans to ensure a smooth basing arrangement.41 These authors counter Johnson by 
arguing that the United States infrequently asserts pressures akin to ruling over its hosts. 
By allowing the Americans a permanent presence in their country, Japanese leaders 
willfully forfeited aspects of their national sovereignty in exchange for security 
guarantees and other benefits.42 Through this bilateral relationship, Tokyo is not without 
recourse in its partnership with the United States. Although the United States has 
benefitted substantially from its foreign basing rights, these authors claim that “the U.S. 
basing network is not a fully-blown empire.”43 Through the years, Tokyo has acquiesced 
to American requests to become a more active ally, because LDP ambitions “intersected 
so nicely with [the United States’] own plans to bend [Japan’s] peace constitution and 
beef up its military.”44 Even when the LDP finally (but briefly) lost political power in 
1993, the new Socialist prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi, did little to upset Tokyo’s 
support of America-basing rights: he declared Japan’s SDF as constitutional and labeled 
the security partnership with the U.S. as “indispensable.”45 
Analysts agree that Tokyo has been successful in preserving the American basing 
presence in spite of staunch Okinawan opposition. After Okinawa’s 1972 reversion, 
Eldridge contends that the majority of Okinawans felt that their daily lives were 
improved; however, anti-base sentiments and anti-war movements remained 
commonplace on the island.46 During the 1970s, the LDP advocated for national 
economic success while debate over the American bases in mainland Japan subsided. 
According to Cooley, anti-base sentiment was confined in the early-1970s to Okinawa, 
which remained an impoverished prefecture.47 By 1982, only ten percent of Okinawans 
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favored the status quo of American forces on their island.48 In the 1980s, the Japanese 
government significantly increased their monetary contributions to the American military 
presence while adeptly managing the political and economic impact of American bases.49 
Cooley determines that local politics have remained polarized by a desire to rid the island 
of the Americans and the need to secure Okinawa’s economic well-being.50 
Countering the basing proponents, Johnson (in 2000) defined American bases in 
Okinawa as constituting “collusion” with Japan against the Okinawans.51 He also deemed 
Okinawa undercompensated because only five percent of its gross domestic product came 
from the bases while Americans occupied 20 percent of the land, much of which was 
premium real estate.52 Although Japan enjoyed tremendous economic growth during the 
second half of the twentieth century, Okinawa remained the poorest prefecture, 
prompting Johnson’s description of Okinawa as the “garbage dump” of the base-security 
agreement.53 Equally critical of how Washington and Tokyo have collaborated against 
Okinawa, McCormack argues: “The state itself, with its monopoly of force and rude 
contempt for Okinawan wishes came to epitomize violence and lawlessness as it sought 
by all means to defeat an enemy that was not China or North Korea, but Okinawa.”54 
Disputing the points made by Johnson and McCormack, Cooley notes that “At three key 
junctures in Okinawan history since reversion—1978, 1998, and 2006—local political 
candidates who emphasized national unity and base-related economic benefits triumphed 
over anti-base incumbents and candidates who questioned the U.S. basing presence and 
the legitimacy of its underlying agreements.”55 By electing a pro-base governor in those 
critical elections, Okinawans endorsed the Japanese-American basing arrangement and 
rejected an opportunity to change the status quo (by electing an anti-base candidate). 
                                                 
48 Eldridge, Post-Reversion Okinawa, 71. 
49 Cooley, Base Politics, 215. 
50 Ibid., 156–57. 
51 Johnson, Blowback, 57. 
52 Ibid., 51.  
53 Ibid., 40–41. 
54 McCormack, “Okinawa’s ‘Darkest Year,’” 2. 
55 Cooley, Base Politics, 173. 
 20 
Cooley claims that Okinawan public opinion is divided over the presence of American 
bases.56 
Considerable debate exists among analysts over the strategic value of American 
forces defending Japan from Okinawan installations. McCormack argues that American 
Marines protecting Japan from bases in Okinawa is not representative of sound military 
strategy, but politically motivated as no other prefecture was willing to permanently host 
the Marines.57 In late 1989, only 5.9 percent of Okinawans felt that U.S. bases in 
Okinawa were required to protect Japan.58 Supporters of the American basing 
arrangements in Japan view the issue from a different standpoint by claiming the bases 
provide the Americans with a regional presence, yielding soft-power and deterring action. 
In addition, Okinawa provides the Americans a presence in the East China Sea, only 400 
miles from Taipei. Answering McCormack’s claim, Mochizuki argues that the 
Washington-Tokyo alliance does not require an external threat in order to maintain a 
security partnership; this relationship should maintain deterrence in Northeast Asia by 
championing “common values, shared effort and shared decision-making.”59 
Analyzing the success of anti-base political movements, Andrew Yeo refers to 
this tri-lateral relationship as “a two level board game with three players.”60 Although 
Okinawan anti-base protesters have not achieved their ultimate goal of eliminating the 
American presence on their island, they have achieved smaller political victories in 
transferring KC-130s and Harriers to Iwakuni Air Base, limiting night flights at Futenma, 
and minimizing jet noise at Kadena.61 Identifying changes to the global landscape, Yeo 
states, “the recent surge of anti-base and anti-American protests, even among alliance 
partners, may be indicative of fundamental changes and resistance to a U.S.-led political 
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order.”62 Feffer argues that the Obama Administration has preserved American basing 
rights in Japan even though American influence has declined after Iraq and 
Afghanistan.63 Air bases in Kadena and Yokota enable the U.S. to project power and 
troops throughout the region alongside the U.S. Navy’s largest base on foreign soil 
(Yokosuka). 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, analysts have divided opinions over the 
necessity of maintaining overseas American bases. According to Johnson in 2000, U.S. 
leadership had erroneously convinced themselves that closing a single American overseas 
base would lead to instability and chaos, contributing to the U.S. exacting economic 
pressure on Asian countries as a means of diplomacy.64 Some analysts have condemned 
American strategy following the Cold War where the new aim was to be able to fight two 
large wars in different parts of the world.65 This strategy helped avoid identifying 
potential adversaries and preserved a rationale for continued American base presence. 
With Japan paying the U.S. approximately six billion dollars in 2002, Johnson explained 
that money was the main reason why American troops remained stationed on Okinawa.66 
He believed that the Americans had “virtually no deterrent effect on China’s decision-
making concerning Taiwan, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of 
any Taiwanese attempt to formally declare its independence.”67 
A pro-base scholar, Eldridge argues that following the end of the Cold War, the 
U.S. intended to draw down American forces in Okinawa, but external dynamics 
prevented large changes including the 1993 beginning of North Korea’s nuclear program 
and the Philippines’ rejection of continued American presence at Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval Base.68 Additionally, 1992 American budgetary issues barred moving 
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additional ships to Sasebo, Japan. Eldridge contends that these obstacles contributed to 
minimal changes to the American overseas basing presence. Adding a different 
perspective to the strategic assessment of Okinawan bases, Mochizuki argues that the 
number of Marines stationed in Okinawa could be reduced without damaging the 
American strategic position in Northeast Asia.69 With plans to reduce the Marine Corps 
by 20,000 members over the next few years, scaling back the Okinawa presence would 
help the local economies of Hawaii, California, and North Carolina.70 Since Guam base 
construction has faced numerous challenges and the Okinawa problem remains ongoing, 
the Marines could leave pre-positioned equipment in the region, but reduce the numbers 
of boots on the ground, assuaging poor relations with Okinawans. 
While some view the Americans as a peacekeeping, stabilizing force, others like 
Johnson have been critical of U.S. foreign policy: “Military crimes, accidents, and 
atrocities make up only one category on the debit side of the balance sheet that the United 
States has been accumulating, especially since the Cold War ended.”71 Between 1972 and 
1995, American servicemen committed over 4,700 crimes in Okinawa, including 12 
murders of local citizens.72 Through the years, the American basing presence has caused 
environmental damage like noise pollution, water contamination, oil spills, damage to 
trees, and raw sewage leaks. Johnson describes excessive noise from Okinawan-based 
aircraft as a distractor for Okinawan citizens and schools, fueling anti-base sentiment 
with local residents. In 1982, 906 noise-complaint lawsuits were filed by local citizens 
against Kadena.73 The island of Okinawa has been polluted by jet fuel runoff and toxic 
substances, mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls.74 On numerous occasions, hazardous 
waste from Kadena has polluted the Hija River, which yields drinking water to the local 
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population.75 Furthermore, military exercises and weapons firings at Camp Hansen have 
caused forest fires and soil erosion.76 Following the 1995 Okinawa-servicemen-rape 
controversy, McCormack argues that the U.S. was open to relocating the Marines from 
Okinawa, but Tokyo insisted that the Marines remain on the island.77 McCormack posits 
that Tokyo was unwilling to allow the Marines to leave Okinawa for two reasons: 
Japanese leaders wanted to maintain their presence, but they did not want the Marines 
moved to mainland-Japan.78 Proponents of the American basing presence acknowledge 
that these incidents mentioned by Johnson are destabilizing to the basing agreement. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed contemporary Okinawa through the lens of the tri-lateral 
relationships between Tokyo, Washington, and Okinawa. It explained why considerable 
general tension exists in Okinawa and how history and culture continue to affect these 
relationships. General tension in Okinawa subsists because of the high number of 
American bases on the island, its status as Japan’s poorest prefecture, Okinawa’s 
tumultuous relationship with Tokyo, frustrations over the relocation of Futenma, an anti-
base media, U.S. military externalities (crime, accidents, pollution, etc.), and debate over 
the strategic necessity of American bases. The literature review explained differing 
opinions from analysts regarding contemporary Okinawan basing issues including: 
America’s sustained Japanese basing presence, debate over Okinawa being victimized by 
hosting a high-percentage of American installations, America’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy, U.S. military crime/accidents/pollution, and debate over Futenma’s significance 
and relocation plans. 
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III. OKINAWAN POLITICIZATION AND COMPENSATION 
POLITICS 
This chapter analyzes the destabilizing and stabilizing forces acting upon the 
continued American basing presence. With varying goals, Okinawan social activists are 
keen to exploit any American incident in order to receive financial compensation, a 
particular political concession, or the ultimate removal of American forces from their 
island. These linked but fragmented protests aim to undermine the stability of the basing 
presence. Japanese national institutions and Tokyo’s elites seek to counter these forces, 
relying heavily upon dividing and weakening local political autonomy. This chapter 
provides an overview of history and themes pertaining to Okinawan political activism as 
the primary destabilizing force before outlining the stabilizing influences of Tokyo’s 
compensation politics, the Japanese security consensus, and weak Okinawan government. 
A. DESTABILIZING FACTORS: OKINAWAN ANTI-BASE POLITICS 
A long, contentious history has played a role in developing Okinawan base 
politics as a destabilizing force for the American basing presence. The 1945 Battle for 
Okinawa left the population with a loathing for war and a resentment of the way they 
were treated by the Japanese. Japan regained its sovereignty in 1951, but Okinawa 
remained under American control. Thus, the first round of Okinawan political activism 
was directed toward the American possession of land and continued military presence on 
the island.79 Eventually, this conflict was resolved as landowners signed legal documents 
with the Americans, receiving cash settlements. During the 1960s, Okinawan activists, 
political parties, and unions banded together to protest American accidents, crime, and 
Kadena-based B-52’s conducting bombing strikes in Vietnam. In 1972, Okinawan 
activists strongly supported the decision made by Tokyo leadership to have the 
Americans cede control of the island to Japan. 
Since the 1970s, anti-base activists have included grassroots participants, non-
governmental organizations, civic organizations, and local community groups. These 
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organizations rally support for their various causes and often “resort to informal, 
contentious politics—including protests, social movements, and other forms of collective 
action—to influence basing policy decisions.”80 Activist groups are motivated by 
different goals including financial compensation, suspension of new base construction, 
and eradication of certain American military training practices, reduced 
crime/accidents/pollution, or the all-together elimination of American forces from their 
island. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, significant anti-base opposition was contained until the 
1995 rape scandal. Anti-base protests grew to unforeseen levels, culminating in an 
October 21 rally where 85,000 citizens rallied to issue their resolution demands.81 Fueled 
by anti-base Governor Masahide Ota’s dramatic posturing, Okinawans demanded an 
account for changes to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), advocated for improved 
discipline of American service members, and urged a reduction of bases. Ota linked the 
rape case to the “historical narrative of Okinawa’s marginalization,” and equated the 
crime with the 1945 Battle for Okinawa and the prefecture’s inferior status.82 
Responding to the 1995 rape crisis, Tokyo created a Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa (SACO); the SACO eventually produced a December 1996 report that called for 
the return of Futenma, a 21 percent reduction of American-held land, and operational 
changes to the bases.83 Although the Japanese government agreed to these concessions, 
the crisis passed, and American basing presence was largely preserved. The Americans 
operational capacity was unaffected by relinquishing ten smaller installations as bases 
were consolidated, leading to new military housing construction and a new hospital. With 
Tokyo paying the price for new construction projects, Japanese leaders discovered a new 
means to invest in the local economy, building support for a tolerated American presence. 
Furthermore, Futenma remained open due to gridlocked debate over finding a relocation 
site. 
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Most victories for anti-base protesters have been modest but include the 
agreement to relocate Futenma, the 1997 denial of the offshore helicopter platform, and 
the rejection of Tokyo’s 2005 plan to begin construction on the “coral reef” base plan.84 
In the aftermath of each concession, Tokyo “countered the activists’ tactical gains by 
putting forth new proposals keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa and managing positive 
alliance relations with the United States.”85 Following contentious events that have 
produced significant uproar toward the American basing presence, the Japanese national 
government repeatedly assuaged concerns by offering concessions that typically lacked 
strategic value. 
An example of a more serious victory for anti-base protesters occurred in 1989 
when Tokyo abandoned plans for building a new Marine AV-8B Harrier pad near Aha 
village. A political concession was made by LDP leaders because of controversy 
surrounding a string of American incidents, a lack of external threat as the Cold War was 
ending, and the eroding approval rating of the LDP. During this timeframe, the LDP was 
plagued by corruption issues and the Recruit scandal forced Prime Minister Noboru 
Takeshita to resign in June of 1989. The presence of American bases was challenged in 
the late-1980s because of four unrelated safety incidents: a helicopter crash, a parachute 
training fatality, an emergency landing in Naha, and a Newsweek article that referred to a 
mishap on the USS Ticonderoga in 1965, in which a hydrogen-bomb-loaded American 
A-4E fell off the deck of the aircraft carrier and sank to the bottom of the sea 500 miles 
off the coast of Okinawa; the aircraft, bomb, and pilot were never recovered.86 These 
incidents led Okinawan activists to demand safety investigations, declines in public 
opinion, and requests for the removal of American aircraft from the island. An October 
1988 on-base CH-46 helicopter crash, which killed four Americans, occurred at a time 
when the LDP was struggling politically, and contributed to Tokyo’s decision in March 
1989 to abandon the construction project.87 In this case, protesters politicized a rash of 
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American accidents during a politically contentious time and achieved a tangible victory, 
reducing the number of Harriers on Okinawa. Essentially, the LDP performed damage 
control by making a calculated political concession with the objective of cooling 
Okinawan tensions. 
Okinawan political activism since 1945 has been labeled as pragmatic protest. 
Classified according to their motives, Calder identifies three main types of anti-base 
protests: ideological, nationalistic, and pragmatic.88 Ideological protesters are ethically 
opposed to basing rights and nationalistic protests are characterized by an opposition to 
American global hegemony. Pragmatic protesters are commonly oriented toward 
environmental issues, crime, accidents, and social disruption; this type is the most 
vulnerable to financial compensation and the most distinct to Okinawa.89 Pragmatic 
social movements are incentive-driven in Okinawa because, “such protest reflects local 
sentiments, thus gaining votes for local politicians, and also induces the central 
government to heavily compensate an impoverished, relatively remote prefecture.”90 
Tokyo has consistently used compensation politics to assuage protests and stabilize the 
American basing presence. 
B. STABILIZING FORCES 
Although the harrier pad example illustrates how activists can undermine the 
American basing presence, most attempts at changing U.S. operations fail because they 
are mediated by Tokyo’s compensation politics, Japan’s strong security consensus, and 
the weakness of Okinawan governance. With Japanese leaders committed to preventing 
major changes to the American security partnership, they deploy their substantial 
resources toward assuaging local dissent and fragmenting Okinawan interests. 
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1. Compensation Politics 
Tokyo’s use of compensation politics serves the purposes of reducing overall 
general tension levels in Okinawa and calming political frictions (to various degrees) 
after catalytic events. Tokyo protects American military operations in Okinawa by 
dividing Okinawa into factions (by buying-off members of the local population). With 
anti-militarism commonplace in Okinawa, base stability has been attained through 
substantial and reliable Japanese governmental payments. Okinawans traditionally 
welcome aid from Tokyo, but predominantly oppose U.S. forces in their prefecture. 
Opposition to American troop presence has been mollified through compensation politics 
described as “politics directed primarily toward advertising and satisfying demands for 
material satisfaction between grantors and supporters, as opposed to those politics 
oriented toward attaining nonmaterial goals.”91 Other means of compensation include 
Tokyo’s donations to public works projects, contributions to local interest groups, noise 
pollution reduction, and accident prevention.92 
The largest organization of its kind in the world, Japan’s Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency (DFAA) was established to serve as a mediator between Japanese 
citizens and the American military presence. The DFAA was abolished in 2007, but its 
mission was preserved through the Ministry of Defense’s Bureau of Local Cooperation 
(BLC).93 Another viable tool to manage base politics, the Special Advisory Council on 
Okinawa (SACO) was established after the 1995 rape crisis, as discussed earlier. 
Following that event, 76 percent of Okinawa news stories pertained to changing the 
American base status quo.94 Calder explained that in 2007 the DFAA was locally-
oriented, cooperative with Japan’s SDF, and effective at quelling the concerns of 
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Japanese citizens in large part because of its decentralized organization.95 The DFAA and 
SACO have combined to “fine-tune and accelerate Japanese central government 
responsiveness to local base problems.”96 Yeo agrees that Tokyo’s compensation politics 
have been successful in dividing Okinawan anti-base sentiment into different factions.97 
In order for a grassroots social movement to gain traction and lead to policy 
changes, coalitions must be built nationally or internationally.98 Smaller organizations 
must strategically ally with other, larger groups in order to achieve objectives; 
“movement brokers” are required to build the scope of the protest and connect protesters 
with elites.99 As social movements increase in size, however, they often struggle to 
maintain unity of focus with their ultimate goals. Okinawan citizens are divided along 
economic, geographic, and political lines in their view of the U.S. military basing 
presence. Where some want Futenma’s return to the Okinawan people, others oppose a 
replacement base built near their town. Where some want the Americans gone from the 
island, others are financially invested in the current arrangement. Since the Americans 
cannot legally negotiate directly with Okinawans, the host-state is at the political center 
of basing agreements.100 Leaders in Tokyo have capitalized on opportunities to reinforce 
divisions among varying Okinawan factions, diluting anti-base momentum and 
stabilizing American bases. Similarly, Okinawan anti-base activists have been unable to 
infiltrate or influence decision-makers in Tokyo. 
Compensation politics entrenches the pro-base side and therefore makes this an 
intra-Okinawan issue, not just an Okinawa versus Tokyo one. Significantly, 
compensation politics both perpetuates and undermines political activism; Tokyo’s 
compensation methods quell tensions, but also incentivize protesters to remain active. 
The local representatives of the DFAA/BLC and SACO have stabilized relations with the 
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local residents. Of course, the compensation politics system has the ability to contribute 
to general tension based on a change of Tokyo elites’ political consensus (a shift from pro 
to anti-American bases) and the polarization of local Okinawan politics (this could lead 
to further frustrations with the anti-base contingent). 
By interjecting debate over where to move the Marines on the island, Japanese 
national leaders were able to split public opinion in Okinawa, eroding the strength and 
cohesion of anti-base activists.101 Tokyo also began spending huge amounts of money in 
Okinawan communities that hosted American forces, creating a pipeline for creating 
financial incentives and building allegiances to national goals. Essentially, the Japanese 
national government took advantage of a crisis by dividing public opinion and sabotaging 
the anti-base movement. Cooley and Nexon explain: “Tokyo, through a well-funded 
program of host-nation support, has created a series of internal constituencies (base 
worker unions, utility companies, construction firms) that benefit from a continued U.S. 
presence.”102 
2. Japan’s Security Consensus 
Okinawan anti-base movements have been marginalized by their inability to 
penetrate the inner-circles of Japan’s national government. In spite of numerous 
contentious events involving American service members in Okinawa, the collaboration of 
Washington and Tokyo has created a durable status quo. Tokyo has mastered tactics of 
dividing and dissipating anti-base movements. Yeo defines security consensus as, “the 
shared perception and intersubjective understanding of the concept of national security 
held by host-government elites.”103 With its security consensus embedded in Japanese 
culture and domestic institutions, Japan has preserved strong national ties to the 
American alliance.104 Ideals held by governmental elites are crucial in determining 
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whether a foreign military presence is preserved.105 After studying responses and 
concessions of Japanese institutions toward anti-base movements, Yeo deems Japan’s 
security consensus as strong and committed to supporting the U.S. military presence 
throughout times of tribulation.106 Okinawans who benefit through various forms of 
national compensation have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo with the 
American basing arrangement. Yeo argues: “Delays and co-optation through token 
concessions and economic incentives have helped Tokyo maintain positive alliance ties 
to the United States at the expense of Okinawan anti-base movements.”107 Peter 
Katzenstein agrees that “Japan has embraced what looks like a grand strategy of 
unquestioned security alignment with the United States … Japan is deeply invested in 
enhancing its special relationship with the United States.”108 
Traditionally, social activists are able to achieve their objectives and change 
military basing arrangements in countries with a weak security consensus.109 Therefore, 
anti-base protests in Okinawa might draw tens of thousands of supporters and have the 
support of the local politicians including the prefecture governor, but the movement will 
likely fail unless it sways the opinions of Japanese elites in Tokyo; these elites include 
leaders involved in national security decision-making and foreign policy.110 In other 
words, significant concessions (including major changes to the SOFA) will not occur 
unless the perceptions and values of national leaders change so that they no longer 
support the Japanese-American alliance. Although Prime Minister Abe is a staunch 
advocate of maintaining the American basing presence, there is no guarantee that future 
Tokyo elites will share his resolve. 
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3. Okinawan Local Government 
Calder classifies Okinawa’s local government as weak, which contributes to a 
moderately stable American base presence in spite of staunch anti-Americanism.111 
American base opposition in Japan is highest in Okinawa (home to 75 percent of 
American base facilities), but local Okinawan government has had minimal influence on 
Tokyo base policies.112 Lacking a powerful governor or politically connected members 
of parliament, Okinawans are politically, economically, and geographically isolated from 
the Japanese national government. Okinawans believe their culture is distinct from the 
rest of Japan and voters typically elect non-LDP Diet representatives, disconnecting 
Okinawa from the dominant Japanese political party. Furthermore, the prefectural 
governor has a difficult task of balancing the desires of his constituents against Tokyo’s 
national goals. With conflicting interests, Tokyo has consistently pushed national policies 
in spite of heavy Okinawan opposition. In December 2014, anti-base Governor Onaga 
took office, remaining committed to his pre-election goals of fighting Henoko 
construction and removing the MV-22 Osprey from Okinawa. Tokyo’s elites did not 
accept Onaga’s political requests. Following in the footsteps of the former-alienated, anti-
base Governor Ota Masahide (1990–1998), LDP leadership in Tokyo reminded Okinawa 
that there is “no need to cooperate with those who have gone over to the enemy.”113 
With Okinawan culture and interests categorically different than those in 
prefectures on the mainland, governors are faced with monumental challenges. Often, 
Tokyo will implement policies in spite of opposition from the prefecture’s government. 
Although local politicians have relatively weak power, they still play major roles in either 
exacerbating or quelling a crisis like an airplane crash. Focusing their research on 
gubernatorial elections from 1972–2006, Kori Kagotani and Yuki Yanai compare anti-
base sentiment and external threats with Okinawan voting patterns. They analyze the 
contradiction between Okinawans being predominantly anti-base in their ideology and 
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their election of six pro-base governors (out of 10 elections).114 Okinawan voters 
supported pro-base politicians during tense-Cold War moments, during times of 
increased tension with China, and when North Korea has performed missile testing. 
Kagotani and Yanai’s research concludes that North Korean missile testing in 1998 began 
a trend where Okinawans perceived greater external threats than they did during the Cold 
War.115 In summary, when Okinawans perceive an external security threat, they are more 
willing to vote for the pro-base politician, endorsing the candidate who represents the 
American-Japanese alliance and stronger national security. 
Kagotani and Yanai underscore the possibility of catalytic events being game 
changers as “physical and psychological costs such as airplane crashes, environment and 
noise pollution, and rape incidents have larger influence on the election outcomes rather 
than material benefits such as fiscal transfers and base-related subsidies, which is 
contrary to the conventional view.”116 This finding calls into question the ability of 
Japanese compensation politics to preserve American basing rights during a major crisis. 
In other words, a crash could unify disparate anti-base actors and become an 
unpredictable game-changer that Tokyo might not be able to satisfy without making 
major political concessions. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the destabilizing and stabilizing forces acting on the 
American basing presence. A historical background on political activism was provided 
emphasizing the pragmatic nature of Okinawan protests and describing two political 
concessions made by Tokyo. The 1989 canceled Harrier pad construction project 
underscores the multiple aligned conditions that merited a political concession from 
Tokyo. Next, the reader was introduced to the forces that stabilize U.S. forces including 
compensation politics, Tokyo’s strong security consensus, and Okinawa’s weak 
government. With ample economic resources, Tokyo satiates anti-base movements with 
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various payments and investments. The durability of Japan’s security consensus was 
detailed, highlighting Japanese political elites’ commitment to the American basing 
presence; political activists have been unable to achieve major concessions because of 
their inability to win over the support of elites. A review of Okinawa’s isolated and weak 
local government was provided to highlight the leadership challenges faced by the 
Okinawa Prefecture Government (OPG), Diet representatives, and the inability of 
Okinawa’s democratic process to effect change in Tokyo. External security threats were 
discussed as times of increased threats have led to more voting support for pro-base 
Okinawan governors. This chapter concludes with a reminder that a catalytic accident or 
incident has the potential to transcend the capabilities of Tokyo’s compensation politics. 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND FACTORS ASSOCIATED 
WITH AVIATION CRASHES 
As long as bases remain open in Okinawa, American aircraft will fly over public 
and private land, risking the devastating consequences of a crash. However, variation 
exists in the politicization of each accident based on its characteristics and severity. In 
order to gain insight to on how crashes were politicized, five crashes were selected for 
analysis. After reviewing these cases, 15 individual crash factors were identified as 
playing significant roles in the political aftermath of accidents. These crash factors were 
compared and contrasted in order to determine their individual significance and 
contribution to politicization. This chapter’s presentation of each crash includes a 
narrative, a summary of the aftermath, and an analysis of crash factors. This chapter 
determines which crash factors are most inflammatory and which factors the American 
basing presence can influence. 
A. CRASH FACTORS 
It is evident that each individual crash carries with it a multitude of factors that 
can be politicized toward various objectives. The crash factors identified in this study can 
be roughly grouped into five main categories, including: location, victims, the American 
force involved, the geopolitical background, and the interaction between the U.S. military 
and Okinawans. The first is where the crash occurs. Whether it occurs on base, in the 
township, or whether significant environmental factors all are relevant to how the crash is 
politicized. The second category involves the injuries and/or fatalities from the accident. 
A crash that kills or injures civilians is a highly contentious event that risks destabilizing 
the American basing presence. An accident that kills a U.S. service member, however, 
can stabilize the political fallout of a crash as Okinawans traditionally are sympathetic to 
loss of life. Third, the force involved is considered by evaluating the political impact of 
an accident involving MCAS Futenma or the U.S. Marine Corps. 
The fourth category of factors involves the geopolitical context in which a crash 
occurs. These factors include the pro or anti-base political orientation of Okinawan 
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leaders, political disconnect between Tokyo and Washington, the prevalence of recent 
American incidents, and the perceived external threats to Okinawans. Also, Okinawan 
anti-base activists gained increasing political momentum after two distinct events: 
Okinawa’s Reversion and the 1995 rape crisis. Therefore, incidents occurring after each 
of these events receive greater anti-base mobilization and resistance. The geopolitical 
climate is defined by the preceding factors, creating times of increased or reduced 
political scrutiny for American forces. The fifth category is specific to how U.S. forces 
respond to a crash and cooperate with local organizations including Okinawan media, 
political leaders, and emergency responders. Following a crash, the actions taken by U.S. 
forces play a huge role in inflaming or suppressing a crisis. 
The preceding factors are depicted in Table 1. The chart consists of individual 
crash factors and identifies whether or not each factor is applicable to each accident. 
Check marks in the crash factor chart represent either a known crash factor or an 
assessment of representing a significant level of political controversy. Not all crash 
factors are weighted equally. The factors are arranged in the chart so that, in general, the 
more checkmarks, the greater the level of political controversy. At the bottom of the 
chart, the overall level of politicization is assigned as high, moderate, or low. 
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Table 1.   Crash Factors Chart 
 
B. 2004 CH-53D CRASH VERSUS 2013 HH-60 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The first case study analysis compares the Futenma-based Marine 2004 CH-53D 
accident at Okinawa University with the Kadena-based 2013 Air Force HH-60 crash at 
Camp Hansen. The 2004 crash was politicized on a high level, involving a crash in the 
township, poor interagency cooperation, poor U.S. Marine public relations, 
environmental concerns, and crash-site controversy. Providing major contrasts, the 
minimally politicized 2013 Air Force HH-60 accident took place on U.S. base property, 
included a U.S. serviceman fatality, represented effective interagency cooperation, and 
the post-crash public relations campaign was highly successful. The 2004 crash remains a 
poignant event in contemporary Okinawa while the 2013 accident faded quickly into 
memory. Reviewing these accidents reveals a stark contrast in crash circumstances and 
the American response to the crisis. Some crash factors cannot be controlled, but 
American forces have the ability to influence others. Table 2 shows the contradictions 
between these two accidents. 
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Table 2.   2004 CH-53D versus 2013 HH-60 Crash Factors Chart 
 
 
1. 2004 Marine Helicopter Crash at Okinawa International University 
On August 13, 2004, a U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter 
crashed on campus at Okinawa International University. Attempting to return for an 
emergency landing at Futenma, the pilots of the CH-53 crash-landed 330 meters short of 
the airfield fence-line.117 In spite of degraded flying qualities, the pilots navigated the 
damaged helicopter away from buildings and nearby homes, preventing “a tragedy on a 
grand scale.”118 Remarkably, nobody was killed on board the helicopter or in the school 
administration building that was impacted by the rotor blades. The only injuries sustained 
were to the aircrew and Marine rescuers.119 The wreck caused damage to the school, 
nearby homes, and vehicles.120 Because the university was on summer break, the campus 
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was populated by only a few hundred people instead of the 6,000 customary to the fall 
semester. 121 
Conducting a training flight, the helicopter and aircrew were assigned to Marine 
Medium Helicopter Squadron 265, which was scheduled to deploy to the Middle East the 
following week.122 The CH-53D hauls personnel, cargo, and equipment, providing heavy 
lift capabilities for the Marine Corps.123 The helicopter is among the largest helicopters 
in the world, weighing over 20 tons with 72-foot rotor blades.124 A safety investigation 
determined that the crash occurred because a “small retaining device in a sub-component 
of the tail rotor assembly was missing, leading to a loss of tail rotor control.”125 More 
clearly, an improper maintenance procedure was the accepted causal factor of the mishap. 
Multiple witnesses reported seeing the tail rotor and associated fin detach from the 
aircraft in flight and land over 350 meters away from the ultimate crash site.126 
A group of Marine maintenance workers at Futenma witnessed the crash and 
immediately ran approximately 500 meters toward the downed helicopter, jumping over 
8- and 15-foot tall barbed-wire fences.127 Once they arrived to the scene, the Marines 
pulled a trapped pilot from the wreckage moments before the aircraft exploded. 
Additionally, the Marines ran into the damaged, smoky university building and ensured 
no people were trapped inside the offices—all 22 people had previously evacuated.128 
The Marines established a perimeter around the aircraft wreckage with the intent of 
protecting the curious local residents from the active fire. Japanese and American police, 
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fire fighters, and emergency responders arrived thereafter to extinguish the fire and care 
for the injured Marines. After hearing of the crash, Marine Lieutenant General Robert 
Blackman ordered the return of all aircraft to base and Futenma flight operations were 
suspended for the following three days.129 
U.S. forces worked directly with the Okinawa Prefecture Police (OPP) in order to 
secure the crash-site, preserve the area so that a proper safety investigation could be 
conducted, and ensure the safety of the local population.130 According to a U.S. official, 
the Marines invited the Okinawan police to help secure the area closest to the crash site, 
but the OPP declined, claiming a lack of available personnel.131 Even though the 
Americans were working in partnership with Okinawan authorities, controversy ensued 
over the cordoned-off the crash site. U.S. military officials cited the SOFA and long-
standing agreements between Washington and Tokyo in order to justify their actions.132 
Brigadier General James Flock explained in an August 27, 2004, press conference that 
the Americans are the “primary office for handling the wreckage after a mishap” in 
Okinawa.133 
a. Aftermath of Accident 
Okinawan activists politicized the Americans actions by claiming the U.S. 
military demonstrated “an occupation mentality.”134 In the days following the crash, OPP 
authorities made repeated requests to allow their investigators access to the crash site. 
Although the Marines Judge Advocate General’s representative declined those requests, 
members of OPP were allowed supervised access to the crash area on August 17 “for the 
exclusive purpose of recording and observing any and all property damage.”135 Some 
members of the OPP were displeased with this arrangement, prompting an unidentified 
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senior official to tell a newspaper reporter, “We cannot believe the way in which the U.S. 
military, which caused this huge accident, is handling the situation.”136 
Six days following the accident, the airplane debris was finally cleared from 
university property and efforts began to assess the environmental damage caused by 
hazardous materials including fuel, hydraulic, and oil fluids.137 The Marines hired a 
Japanese firm to conduct an environmental study and committed to pay for the removal 
of any and all contaminates from the premises.138 Officials from Okinawa International 
University were dissatisfied with the post-crash actions of the Marine Corps. In 
particular, officials made demands for both a completed aviation accident report and the 
results of the environmental testing performed on the removed topsoil. Hitoshi Nakasone, 
a university spokesman, stated, “We believe it is our right to demand these findings, as it 
is our duty to ensure the safety of our students, faculty and the general public visiting our 
university.”139 Furthermore, university officials were irritated by perceived delays in both 
the investigation process and excessive trees removed from the crash zone. They also 
demanded reimbursement of university property including computers, furniture, and 
office equipment.140 Nakasone complained of emotional trauma for being one of the 22 
people located inside the administration building at the time of the wreck: “Although I 
am getting a little better, there are others who still have frequent nightmares about the 
accident and have difficulties in sleeping.”141 Within 11 days of the crash, Marine 
officials and Defense Facilities Administration Bureau personnel began issuing apology 
money (or owabi); financial compensation for the crash was issued with Washington 
paying 75 percent and Tokyo paying the remaining 25 percent.142 
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Critical of the resumption of flight operations at Futenma, Ginowan City Mayor 
Yoichi Iha demanded the closure of the American base and said, “The accident proved 
how dangerous the air station is—it showed us that Futenma is a defective air station, 
therefore no aircraft operations should be conducted.”143 A young, popular, anti-base 
Okinawan politician, Iha was mayor of the fourth largest city on the island. With Pro-
base Governor Inamine Keiichi visiting Okinawan descendants living in South America 
at the time of the helicopter crash, Iha took the initiative to connect with Okinawans as a 
prominent public leader.144 Iha complained that local citizens would live in fear every 
time they hear a helicopter fly over them and that “The helicopter involved in this 
accident flew about 300 to 400 meters after it started having trouble until it 
crashed…during that time it flew over densely populated areas.”145 Iha’s concern over 
increased population around Futenma has been echoed by other anti-base activists. Of 
course, a major accident like the CH-53 crash at the university can lead to unforeseen 
consequences and significantly change perceptions of basing arrangements. After 
viewing the crash site the morning after the accident, Mayor Iha addressed the local 
media at City Hall: 
The purpose of the U.S. military investigation is different [from that of the 
Japanese side]. For them, the most important thing is to preserve the 
helicopter’s body, and has nothing to do with the damage to residents and 
structures. What should be given priority is different. This recent 
happening was a U.S. military accident, but it was also a [local] incident. 
While it happened on duty, it occurred off-base, and it is strange that the 
U.S. military is proceeding unilaterally.146 
This quote from Mayor Iha inspired a rift between the U.S. military and 
Okinawans, enflaming public opinion. By calling into question the integrity of the U.S. 
military, Iha politicized the crash in order to encourage anti-base sentiment. That same 
day, the Ginowan City assembly followed Iha’s lead and drafted a protest resolution that 
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called for a series of demands including the revision of the SOFA, the closure of 
Futenma, an honest investigation of the crash, and the elimination of any flights over 
residential areas.147 The resolution was unanimously passed by the assembly and copies 
were distributed to the Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, U.S. military forces, and 
others.  
A meeting between Mayor Iha and Brigadier General Flock led to further anti-
base resentment after Flock informed Iha that flights at Futenma would soon be resumed. 
By August 18, Iha was in Tokyo advocating for the following: Futenma’s closure, proper 
apologies for the accident, compensation for those affected by the crash, restricted flying 
over residential areas, and assistance for the university.148 Later that night, Iha briefed 
Governor Inamine in Tokyo, who had recently returned from his South America trip. 
While Governor Inamine was away from Okinawa, the OPG was guided by a team 
including Vice Governors Makino Hirotaka and Higa Shigemasa. OPG leadership 
conducted meetings with high-ranking officers from the Marine Corps, representatives of 
the Japanese national government, and members of the DFAA. 
Reigniting local controversy around Futenma flight operations, six CH-53Ds 
departed the airfield on August 22 for their operational deployment to Iraq. Press releases 
were provided by the Marine Corps only moments before their departure from Futenma. 
The Marines informed the public that the CH-53Ds were safe to fly because the initial 
safety investigation concluded that the August 13 mishap occurred because of a 
mechanical issue that was “solely unique” to the crashed airframe.149 Governor Inamine 
“felt betrayed” when he heard that the CH-53Ds were airborne because he had recently 
lobbied with Lieutenant General Robert Blackman to cancel the flights.150 Even though 
the helicopters were transiting to the USS Essex en route to a war zone (i.e., not flying a 
training mission) and leaving the prefecture, numerous government organizations filed 
protests denouncing the flights. Mayor Iha publicly stated, “In the midst of all of the 
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protests on Okinawa, this is like pouring oil into a fire” and “Such conduct shows that the 
military regards Okinawa still under military control, disrespecting Japan’s 
sovereignty.”151 Reportedly, even Prime Minister Koizumi opposed the departing flights 
from Futenma.152 The end result was a further breakdown of the relationship between the 
U.S. Marines and Japanese hosts as the perception was that the Americans did what they 
wanted even though the Japanese government opposed their plan. 
A major event, over 30,000 protesters gathered in Ginowan City on September 
12, 2004, to demonstrate for the closure of Futenma’s base.153 Summarizing the 
viewpoint of many Okinawans following the crash, Nakasone said, “We don’t want the 
air station to be here any longer.”154 The aftermath of this crash contributed to a 2006 
Japanese-American decision to relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam by 2014.155 This crash 
also led to several changes in American-Okinawan cooperation including the formation 
of a cooperative working group, which aided collaboration between the U.S. military 
forces, Okinawan authorities, and local emergency responders.156 The hope of the 
cooperative working group was to build trust between the U.S. military and the citizens 
of Okinawa. Other changes after this event included revised flight plans for military 
aircraft and increased standardization among aviators.157 For example, helicopters are 
only permitted to takeoff from the center-mat of the airfield, reducing noise pollution in 
the township. This change also ensures aircraft reach a safe flying altitude prior to 
departing the base property, minimizing the likelihood of a crash into a populated area. 
All the while, protests were coordinated in Okinawa and various governmental 
and non-governmental groups were making compensation demands; 31 of the 52 
Okinawan communities passed resolutions calling for either Futenma’s closure or a 
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review of the SACO.158 The resolution votes, however, were highly divisive based on 
“competing ideological concerns, policy concerns, and vital political and economic 
interests.”159 Specifically, Okinawans were unable to find common ground in regards to 
the SACO’s 1996 Futenma-to-Henoko relocation plan. Although the crash in Ginowan 
City had provided momentum to the movement to close Futenma, it had similarly 
provided those in northern Okinawa with a vivid reminder of the unpredictable nature of 
flight operations. Consequently, the crash in Ginowan City provided those opposed to 
moving the Marines to Henoko with an opportunity to politicize and organize their 
opposition to the relocation plan. In the aftermath of the crash, multiple Okinawan public 
opinion polls illustrated opposition to the Henoko-plan. On August 20, the Ryukyu 
Shimpo reported that 93 percent of respondents supported the revision of the SACO-plan, 
but only 6 percent support the Henoko offshore construction plan.160 On September 14, 
the Okinawa Times published a public opinion poll stating that 81 percent of participants 
opposed relocating the Marines to Henoko and 70 percent of respondents advocated 
moving the Marines somewhere outside of Japan.161 
Once Governor Inamine returned to Okinawa, he faced a major leadership 
challenge, and a series of difficult decisions. Traditionally regarded as a pro-base 
politician, Inamine had to manage pressure from all sides: his constituents, the national 
government, and the Americans. No longer could the OPG ignore the potential dangers 
associated with flight operations out of Futenma, but the relocation plan within the 
prefecture became convoluted.162 OPG leaders worried that scrapping the SACO’s 
relocation plan to the northern portion of the island might ultimately delay the closure of 
Futenma. Thus, Inamine publicly labeled the Henoko project as “the realistic option” and 
he balanced that position by stating he intended to “use all his strength to work 
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toward…realizing the earliest possible elimination of the danger of Futenma Air Station 
and its earliest possible return (to the Okinawans).”163 Later, Inamine settled on a policy 
of minimizing levels of danger at Futenma by reducing the forces at the base, placing 
demands for reduced flights, insisting on the relocation of training, improved overall 
safety procedures, and the cancelation of the Army’s planned Camp Hansen training 
center.164 
b. Analysis of Crash Factors 
The CH-53D crash was a landmark event that redefined aspects of the American 
basing presence. This accident incorporated a wide array of individual factors associated 
with airplane crashes and led to several political concessions. Specifically, this accident 
was the first instance of a U.S. Marine helicopter crashing into the local Okinawan 
community, highlighting the narrow proximity of Futenma to the township. Although the 
university is built against the base’s fence line, the accident triggered widespread unrest. 
Furthermore, the Okinawan pro-base governor was not on the island at the time of the 
incident. It is plausible that Governor Nakaima’s presence would have helped to stabilize 
relations between the American forces and anti-base activists. Environmental issues were 
tied to a host of other problems stemming from the American crash-site cleanup effort.165 
Officials at Okinawa International University were dissatisfied with the actions taken by 
the Marines to rectify their environmental concerns. Specifically, university officials 
were angered by how many trees were cut down and how the soil contamination was 
handled. 
The controversy over the crash site management and perceived poor interagency 
cooperation with local authorities added further political pressure to the crisis. Although 
no one was killed, the mishap “generated a swell of public criticism among Okinawan 
local politicians, civic groups, and the media concerning the “occupation”-like behavior 
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of U.S. forces on the island.”166 Marine Corps public relations and press releases were 
often flawed and untimely, contributing to increased politicization and heightened 
tensions. This accident was further exacerbated because it happened after the 1995 rape 
crisis. In addition, Eldridge contends that this crash was politicized to a higher level 
because incidents involving U.S. Marines are especially volatile with the Okinawan 
public due to history, culture, and a lack of understanding regarding the mission of the 
Marines. 
Totaling an overall high level of politicization, the 2004 CH-53D crash introduces 
numerous factors to the discussion of aviation accidents. It was a major event that led to 
significant political concessions and altered perceptions of the American basing presence 
at Futenma. Putting lessons in place from this crash, a 2013 Air Force helicopter accident 
led to a dramatically different public response and aftermath. 
2. 2013 Air Force HH-60 Crash at Camp Hansen 
On August 5, 2013, an Air Force HH-60 Pave Hawk Helicopter crashed into the 
Camp Hansen jungle, killing one of the four airmen on board. The Kadena-based aircraft 
went down in the Central Training Area, causing a smoke cloud that was seen two miles 
away by residents of Ginoza.167 The helicopter was flying a training mission at low 
altitudes with a second helicopter in the vicinity. There were no injuries to local citizens 
and there was no off-base damage. A safety investigation determined that pilot error was 
the reason for the crash; fearing a mid-air collision with a second nearby helicopter, the 
pilot inadvertently maneuvered the aircraft into the dense forest.168 Emergency 
responders from both the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force arrived to the scene to 
extinguish the small fire and rescue the downed crew.169 
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a. Aftermath of Accident 
The news of the crash was covered thoroughly by Okinawan media, and local 
residents made typical demands for a safety account of the accident. The timing was 
unfortunate for the American basing presence because it occurred three months after an 
Air Force F-15C crashed into the ocean. Additionally, protests were active at nearby 
Futenma as activists were voicing their displeasure over the impending arrival of 12 
additional MV-22 Ospreys to the island.170 The helicopter crash summoned memories of 
the 2004 university incident, prompting Kadena Mayor Hiroshi Toyama to say, “We 
knew it was going to happen sooner or later.”171 The accident did not involve the 
Marines, but it provided more ammunition for anti-base protesters to advocate for 
Futenma’s closure. At this point in 2013, the relocation of the base remained crippled by 
both political opposition to the Henoko construction and increasing financial concerns of 
the move by the Senate Armed Services Committee.172 Even though it occurred during a 
politically contentious time, this accident did not yield high levels of Okinawan 
politicization like the 2004 crash. 
Suggesting improved inter-service cooperation since the 2004 university accident, 
the Air Force and Marines were more successful in their public affairs cooperation with 
Okinawans. At the recommendation of the government of Japan and in an effort to calm 
tensions, the U.S. Marine Corps agreed to delay the arrival of the Ospreys “out of respect 
for the desires of our Japanese partners and hosts.”173 This gesture was indicative of 
joint-forces teamwork and effective Japanese-American partnership. Within hours of the 
crash, U.S. military representatives hosted a press conference, providing Okinawans with 
timely and abundant information. At the meeting, local representatives of Okinawan 
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Police and Fire units volunteered their services to assist American efforts.174 These 
Okinawan organizations participate annually in a joint American-Okinawan aircraft 
mishap response drill. Initiated in the aftermath of the 2004 crash, this exercise has 
improved partnerships and public relations for the U.S. military. According to a U.S. 
military public affairs officer who attended the conference, Okinawan media 
representatives were “thankful and grateful” for the extensive efforts made by the 
American public relations team.175 The local media witnessed the cooperative effort 
between emergency responders and it may have contributed to cooling tensions after the 
accident.176 
Brigadier General James B. Hecker, the Commander of the Air Force 18
th
 Wing at 
Kadena, wrote an apology letter to the Japanese people that was published in the Yomiuri 
Shimbun; Hecker also thanked his “good neighbors here in Okinawa” for their 
sympathies and condolences in regards to Technical Sergeant Mark A. Smith’s death.177 
Explaining to the local residents both the circumstances of the crash and the seriousness 
of how the Air Force views safety procedures, Hecker was able to accommodate 
Okinawan demands for an account of the crash. Perhaps most importantly, Hecker 
explained that the 33
rd
 Rescue Squadron crew that crashed was from the same unit that 
rallied to support Japan following the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011. The 
Kadena-based HH-60s flew 55 emergency response missions supporting what later 
became named Operation Tomodachi; during these missions, the 33
rd
 rescued 51 people 
and delivered approximately 1.4 tons of food, water, and supplies to the Tohoku area.178 
Hecker’s account of 3/11 eloquently described the utility of his HH-60 units and their 
commitment to defending and serving Japan. In the letter, he explained that the Air Force 
received over 125 condolence and support emails from strangers following the 
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accident.179 He outlined the steps the Air Force was in the process of taking in order to 
prevent a similar crash from occurring in the future. From a big-picture standpoint, 
Hecker connected on a human level with the Okinawans, showing respect, gratitude, and 
honest reflection. The op-ed letter helped to deflate tensions in the Okinawan community, 
contributing to low post-crash politicization levels.180 
b. Analysis of Crash Factors 
For a variety of reasons, politicization associated with the 2013 HH-60 crash 
dissipated relatively quickly; in other words, this crash could have been a catalytic event, 
but it was not. Tensions from the crash blew over relatively quickly in Okinawa and 
Futenma experienced no significant increase in protests or demonstrating.181 As shown in 
Table 2 it is evident that the 2013 crash provided remarkably different levels of political 
controversy. Instead of crashing in the township like in 2004, the Air Force accident 
occurred on base and did not threaten the local residents or the township. The local 
residents did not see the crash as the accident was contained on base property. There were 
no significant environmental issues. Since the U.S. Air Force lost an airman in the crash, 
a voice of sensitivity likely calmed protesters as many Okinawans were sympathetic to 
the death of one of Japan’s 3/11’s emergency responders.182 Consequently, the death of a 
U.S. airman also contributed to quelling the magnitude of this incident. 
Unlike the 2004 university crash, the pro-base governor (Nakaima) was in 
Okinawa at the time of the accident and not overseas, stabilizing the post-crash aftermath. 
The public affairs interaction between the U.S. military and the Okinawans was much 
more effective following the 2013 mishap; information was provided in a more timely 
manner, a greater sense of cooperation was achieved, and there was no significant 
controversy over the crash-site management. In large part because of effective public 
relations and successful back-and-forth communication with the local residents, the 
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public outcry for safety information was satiated, halting the politicization of safety 
concerns. In the nine years between helicopter crashes, protocols and emergency 
response plans were established to facilitate more effective operations between the U.S. 
military and Okinawa agencies. The 2013 crash did not carry with it controversy over the 
integration of emergency responders or a perceived security-perimeter ordeal like in 
2004. 
Another key difference was this accident involved a Kadena-based, Air Force 
helicopter and not a Futenma-based, U.S. Marine aircraft. Contributing to misconceptions 
of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa, the Japanese public has a better understanding of the 
purpose of the U.S. Air Force, in large part because the Japanese SDF has an Air 
Force.183 The Japanese, however, lack a Marine Corps and Okinawan culture does not 
share a similar collective understanding of their mission. Furthermore, the Marines are 
the majority American presence of the island (leading to increased human interaction and 
conflict over time), they possess Futenma, and many Okinawans maintain bitterness from 
the 1945 Battle for Okinawa. Through the years, much of the anti-base protests have 
targeted Futenma and the Marines more directly than the Air Force.184 
This section highlights the vast differences in aviation factors associated with the 
Camp Hansen crash when compared to the 2004 university accident. Since the levels of 
politicization were considerably less following this crash, no significant political 
concessions were made by Tokyo. Of note, there are several factors that these two post-
1995 Okinawan accidents have in common, including no civilian fatalities/injuries, a pro-
base governor, national leaders in Tokyo were politically secure, a similar external 
security threat environment, and a safety environment where there was not a recent 
plethora of American accidents. Because the difference in these particular factors was 
negligible, this paired case study does not provide considerable insight to their 
significance. It does show, however, that other crash factors are relevant and deserve 
consideration. 
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C. 1988 CH-46 CRASH VERSUS 1992 CH-46 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The second case study analysis compares two CH-46 crashes: 1988 at Kunigami 
and 1992 at Futenma. Causing the death of four U.S. servicemen, the highly politicized 
Kunigami crash was one of many American incidents in the late 1980s. It occurred when 
the LDP was struggling politically and contributed to a political concession. Offering 
variation, the 1992 accident was moderately politicized, occurred after the Cold War, 
lacked fatalities, and featured an anti-base Okinawan Governor. Although both aircraft 
were operated by Marines from Futenma, this case study highlights differing factors that 
could not be examined in the first analysis. The takeaway is that a rash of American 
accidents can create unmanageable geopolitical scrutiny for Tokyo’s leaders, leading to a 
political concession. Another point of emphasis is that not all crash factors are weighted 
evenly. Table 3 shows the scoring of applicable factors to this case study. 
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Table 3.   1988 CH-46 versus 1992 CH-46 Crash Factors Chart 
 
 
1. 1988 CH-46 Crash at Kunigami 
On October 31, 1988, two Futenma-based Marine Corps CH-46 helicopters 
collided while flying a training mission near Kunigami, Okinawa. The first aircraft 
returned to land uneventfully at Futenma, suffering damage to the nose of the aircraft, but 
there were no injuries to the crew.185 The second helicopter crashed into mountainside 
terrain on the American training installation, killing all four Marines on board and 
causing a forest fire. The reason for the midair collision was unknown. No Okinawans 
witnessed the accident or were harmed by the crash. 
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a. Aftermath of Accident 
In the immediate aftermath of the accident, protest rallies occurred in nearby 
Higashi. A resolution was called to suspend helicopter training activity and a protester 
expressed his anxiety: “No one knows when a big disaster will happen. Let us rise up as 
one to take back our quiet life and safeguard our lives and property.”186 As discussed in 
Chapter II, this crash occurred when the LDP was ailing politically and the U.S. military 
was plagued by a series of recent military accidents. Occurring at the end of the Cold 
War, the U.S. increased their forward deployed forces to deter the Soviet Union from 
action; the Japanese were concerned that increased accidents were indicative of American 
forces accepting that “some excesses [including accidents] should be tolerated.”187 The 
CH-46 mishap was politicized in connection with numerous accidents that the Japanese 
public viewed as indicating a lack of American discipline. Within a few weeks of the 
crash, nine stray bullets were discovered in a nearby town after being fired from nearby 
Camp Hansen.188 There was also a tear-gas explosion in a public Okinawan area. The 
Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno expressed frustration over the rash of recent 
military mishaps by declaring: “There is a lot of carelessness.”189 Additionally, Uno 
speculated what might have occurred if the crash had taken place over a populated area. 
b. Analysis of Crash Factors 
Although this event occurred before the 1995 rape crisis, this crash produced a 
high overall level of politicization. This particular accident did not become a landmark 
event etched into Okinawan’s psyche in large part because it occurred on base and did 
not directly affect the local residents. The 1980s were characterized by a smooth working 
relationship between the U.S. military and Okinawa, but a cluster of late-1980s American 
accidents collaborated with political scandals in Tokyo to create political turmoil for the 
LDP. The American military presence was undermined by these accidents, compelling 
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the LDP to offer a political concession to anti-American activists. Tokyo’s March 1989 
decision to abandon harrier-pad construction was made because of a seemingly unending 
string of disconnected American accidents and the LDP’s plummeting popularity.190 
With Upper and Lower House elections scheduled for late 1989, the LDP’s decision to 
limit the number of harriers in Okinawa was made “out of political necessity.”191 
An extremely rare example of political disconnect between Tokyo and 
Washington, Japanese leadership made this decision even though American leaders 
insisted on continuing with the project.192 After enjoying over three decades of political 
domination, the LDP was weakened politically in the late 1980s, disrupting Japanese-
American base politics relations. In summary, this helicopter crash was not a catalytic 
event in its own regard; instead, it was a contributing event to a broad collection of 
political scandals and safety incidents. 
2. 1992 CH-46 Crash at Futenma 
On October 20, 1992, a U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter crashed while 
taxiing across the airfield at Futenma. After completing a training flight, the helicopter 
pilot lost control of the aircraft as it “turned over while taxiing.”193 There were no 
injuries to the flight crew or bystanders. Since the crash occurred on the airfield apron, 
the accident was well clear of the township and Futenma’s buildings. Because this crash 
was not a politically contentious event, there is a dearth of information on the actual 
event and its aftermath. 
a. Aftermath of Accident 
This crash brought further scrutiny to the safety and reliability of the CH-46 
airframe. In Okinawa, the helicopter had a poor safety record as this incident was “one of 
20 [Okinawan] cases involving the CH-46.”194  Members of the Ginowan City Assembly 
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voted for a resolution calling for the closure of Futenma. While this in particular crash 
was not politicized to a great extent, Eldridge argues that it contributed to strong protests 
18 months later at Kadena and Futenma.195 In early April 1994, an Air Force F-15C 
crashed, and two days later, another Marine CH-46 split apart after a hard landing at 
Futenma. A May 1994 Ryukyu Shimpo weekly news poll claimed that 70 percent of 
Okinawans supported the cancellation of American military training exercises.196 A year 
later, however, the rape crisis would bring massive protests to Okinawa. 
b. Analysis of Crash Factors 
With an overall level of politicization assessed as moderate, the 1992 crash offers 
contrast to the one that occurred four years earlier. Both crashes took place on base in 
pre-1995 Okinawa, and involved the U.S. Marines operating aircraft out of Futenma. 
Likewise, many of the LDP’s political struggles of the late 1980s continued through the 
early 1990s, culminating in the LDP’s 1993 temporary loss of national political power. 
Referencing Table 3, multiple crash factors applied to the 1992 crash that were absent in 
the 1988 incident. The 1988 crash contributed to a political concession, but in spite of 
anti-base Okinawan Governor Ota being in office, the 1992 accident did not. Similarly, 
the external threats to Okinawa were actually higher during the Cold War in 1988 than 
they were in 1992. According to Kagotani and Yanai’s survey results, Okinawan public 
opinion reflects a decrease in perceived security threats from 1988 to 1992.197 Also, the 
1992 crash did not cause any American fatalities like in 1988, as U.S. fatalities serve as a 
quelling factor following a crash. 
According to Table 3, the 1992 accident actually involved one more crash factor 
than the 1988 one (six to five). So, why did political concessions take place in 1988 and 
not in 1992? Because not all crash factors are weighted equally, the 1988 political 
concession was made primarily because of the cluster of recent American accidents in the 
late-1980s, creating a rift between Tokyo and Washington. The accident occurred in a 
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climate of increased U.S. military operational scrutiny, garnering the attention of various 
anti-base protests. Due to geopolitical pressures in 1989, Tokyo’s LDP leaders made a 
political concession against the wishes of the United States. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the cluster of recent accidents and political disconnect between the two 
countries carried more significance than the political leanings of the governor, the 
external security threat to Okinawa, and U.S. military fatalities. Overshadowing other 
crash factors, higher politicization levels (and political concessions) can be expected 
when a rash of accidents occur within a short period of time. Additionally, political 
concessions are more likely to occur when national elites are politically vulnerable. 
3. 1959 Air Force F-100D Crash at Miyamori Primary School 
Since 1959, Okinawa has undergone considerable cultural and political change. 
The Americans were in control of the island in the heart of the Cold War and Okinawans 
had minimal political influence. Post-reversion Okinawa has its own Prefecture 
Government, answers to Tokyo, and has considerably more political opportunity. For 
these reasons, it is unrealistic to compare the aftermath of a 1959 crash to a contemporary 
one. This F-100D crash is discussed because the horrible circumstances of the accident 
have been absorbed into Okinawa’s historical memory. Since then, numerous events have 
destabilized the American basing presence including reversion, the 1995 rape crisis, and 
the 2004 university crash. At each step, the political opposition has improved their 
organization, mobilize resources, and substantiate political connections in Tokyo. A crash 
of this magnitude today would lead to unprecedented levels of anti-base politicization. 
On June 30, 1959, an American Air Force F-100D fighter jet operating from 
Kadena crashed into Miyamori Elementary School (currently named Uruma City 
Miyamori Elementary School) in central Okinawa Prefecture, killing 11 Okinawan 
students and six other people.198 At 10:20 a.m., the crash occurred while school was in 
session.199 Twenty-seven homes were destroyed and five of the victims were survivors of 
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the Battle of Okinawa.200 Carrying four bombs, the F-100 impacted the school directly, 
burning the school down quickly, and causing 121 injuries.201 Witnesses observed an 
engine explosion (the F-100D was a single-engine aircraft) followed by the successful 
ejection of the pilot, escaping the catastrophe unscathed in his parachute. 
a. Aftermath of Accident 
The F-100D crash is the most significant aviation accident in Okinawan history, 
affecting base relations to this day. Contributing to local cynicism, the results of the Air 
Force safety investigation accident report were never released to the Okinawan public.202 
The failure of American forces to communicate the nature of the crash added distrust to a 
community who lost children, teachers, and homes to the tragedy. There was further 
animosity over this crash because the Air Force pilot survived the crash after ejecting. If 
the pilot had stayed with the aircraft longer, he may have been able to steer the jet to a 
less populated area, and avoid the tremendous loss of life. Calling Air Force safety 
procedures further into question, a mother who lost a child to the accident decreed: 
“Flying a jet without carrying out proper maintenance is outrageous…it seems [the U.S. 
military] does not regard Okinawans as people.”203 A teacher who endured the horrible 
accident witnessed “children’s limbs burned off and skin peeled off by the fuel from the 
plane.”204 Okinawans were deeply affected by the crash and families of the victims 
experienced lifelong emotional trauma including miscarriages and amnesia.205 
Even though it occurred over five decades ago, the crash remains a major part of 
contemporary Okinawan culture. Hook labels the accident as “the most poignant military 
accident in the popular memory of Okinawans.”206 A memorial was built on school 
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grounds and every year citizens, politicians, and activists gather to commemorate the 
crash. In a 2007 Ryukyu Shimpo poll, Okinawans identified this crash as the seventh most 
important event in Okinawa’s entire history.207 Even today, this accident is commonly 
politicized and referenced by anti-base protesters in statements to the media and 
resolutions to the government; efforts are made to draw attention to the suffering of 
Okinawans at the expense of the continued American basing presence.208 Uruma City’s 
mayor mentioned the elementary school disaster during a 2012 speech with the goal of 
uniting opposition to the Okinawan deployment of U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 
Ospreys.209 
Hook describes an Okinawan culture categorically opposed to risk: “The memory 
of the tragedy has been passed down through the generations, articulating a strong sense 
of the risk posed by the existence of the bases and the operation of U.S. military aircraft 
in the prefecture, irrespective of the ‘statistically insignificant’ risk posed in terms of the 
absolute number of accidents per flight flown.”210 The idea that “accidents happen” is 
unacceptable to Okinawans. After each military accident, demands are made to both 
account for the improper safety act and conduct a safety review of U.S. military 
procedures. This particular crash was absorbed into Okinawa’s identity, contributing to a 
historical narrative where Americans are careless and unconcerned with the welfare of 
the local populace. Furthermore, Okinawan films have dovetailed this disaster with the 
present-day anti-base movements.211 Alongside the 2004 Okinawa University crash, the 
elementary school accident remains at the forefront of Okinawan memory and is 
politicized to mandate the return of Futenma, the ban on MV-22 Osprey flights, and 
demands to make Okinawa “an island of peace.”212 
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b. Analysis of Crash Factors 
The F-100D crash represents a worst-case scenario: an airplane crash in the 
township causing the death of innocent civilians. Okinawans had less recourse to 
mobilize against the American basing presence in 1959, making direct comparisons to 
contemporary accidents difficult. Still, the 2004 CH-53D University crash draws parallels 
to the F-100D crash (aircraft crashing into the township with significant environmental 
issues), but no civilians were killed or injured in the helicopter accident. Both events 
were also characterized by Okinawan frustration with U.S. military public relations, 
leading to increased resentment and distrust of the American basing presence. 
A crash of this magnitude today would lead to unprecedented levels of Okinawan 
anti-base politicization because of increased political scrutiny, improved 
interconnectedness of anti-base activists (communication and networking), and a 
decreased external threat level (comparing 1959 to today). With current Governor Onaga 
being an outspoken anti-base politician, he would likely enflame a crisis instead of help 
Tokyo with damage control. Commemorating the 50-year anniversary of the crash, 
Ginowan City’s 2009 Mayor Iha Yohei revealed artwork of the crash in his office, 
displaying the caption: “Even today, fifty years later, a U.S. military accident can occur 
anywhere.”213 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented case study analyses of five aviation accidents and 
identified specific crash factors. Crash factors were compared and contrasted in order to 
determine their individual significance and susceptibility to politicization. The overall 
goal of the chapter was to determine which factors contribute to making a crash a ‘big 
one’ and which factors the American basing presence can influence. With the aim of 
predicting the impact of future accidents, this study concludes that the four most 
significant crash factors in Okinawa are a crash site in the township, civilian 
fatalities/injuries, a cluster of recent U.S. military accidents, and poor American post-
crash public relations. It should also be noted that an accident involving MCAS Futenma 
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or the U.S. Marine Corps will be more highly politicized than a crash involving a 
different American base or service. Thus, a Futenma-based aircraft crashing into the 
township and killing civilians represents a worst-case scenario for the American basing 
presence. The three crash factors that the U.S. military has the ability to influence are 
post-crash public relations, crash-site management, and local interagency cooperation. If 
the goal is to stabilize base relations in Okinawa, then American military forces need to 








This chapter identifies three major ways this research can be used. First, this study 
provides insight as to how a crash is likely to be politicized by identifying the 
significance of crash factors. This is a tool for assessing the severity of the politicization 
of an aviation accident. Second, this research identifies specific factors the U.S. military 
has the ability to influence. This may be useful in developing public relations response to 
various American incidents. Third, this analysis also serves as a springboard for future 
potential research regarding base politics. 
A. ASSESSMENT OF HOW AN AVIATION ACCIDENT WILL BE 
POLITICIZED 
This research introduces an assessment tool to retrospectively learn from past 
accidents. The process that has been applied in this thesis can be expanded and applied to 
other areas of research. The crash chart depicted in Table 1 serves as a quick reference to 
gauge the political impact of any accident. In the present, this assessment tool provides an 
estimate of the preliminary consequences of an event. After reviewing case studies, this 
research concludes that the four most significant crash factors in Okinawa are a crash site 
in the township, civilian fatalities/injuries, a cluster of recent U.S. military accidents, and 
poor American post-crash public relations. 
1. Crash Site in the Township and Civilian Fatalities/Injuries 
Since a crash outside the township is unlikely to harm local civilians, this section 
combines the first two factors: crash site in the township and civilian fatalities/injuries. A 
crash in the township is more threatening to the local populace and susceptible to higher 
levels of politicization. Such an accident causes psychological damage to local citizens, 
mobilizes support for political opposition to continued military operations, and places 
political pressure on Tokyo to mediate increased levels of civil unrest. Fortunately, 
Okinawan civilians have not been killed by an American aviation accident since 1959, 
but memories of the Miyamori Elementary jet crash are pervasive in the local population. 
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The Americans were fortunate that the 2004 Okinawa University crash did not lead to 
any civilian injuries or deaths. 
Due to high population density in Ginowan City, Futenma is the Okinawan 
airfield with the highest probability of having an aircraft crash in the township (and 
potentially harming civilians). But the decision was made in 1996 to close Futenma and 
ultimately a replacement facility is planned to provide greater separation between a 
densely populated township and aircraft departure and arrival corridors. With Futenma’s 
continued operation, American and Japanese leadership collaborated to initiate the 
Aviation Training Relocation Program (ATRP) in 2006; the goal of the program was to 
minimize noise pollution and reduce the number of training flights at Futenma.214 The 
ATRP reduced the likelihood of an accident in Ginowan City by relocating training 
evolutions to other American installations on mainland Japan and Guam.215 Many 
Okinawans, however, remain threatened by the potential of an American military crash. 
Accordingly, another crash in the township by an American aircraft is not likely, but it 
would lead to tremendous levels of politicization, whether that accident involved 
Futenma or Kadena. 
2. Cluster of Recent U.S. Military Accidents 
The 1988 CH-46 crash proves that a cluster of American incidents leads to increased 
social activist mobilization and political scrutiny. With each incident, the level of general 
tension increases on the island, creating an environment where even relatively mild events 
can trigger large social reactions. The unrelated and multiple incidents of the late 1980s 
changed societal perceptions of the U.S. basing presence. This rash of occurrences created a 
rift between leaders in Tokyo and Washington. Because all accidents are politicized, there is 
never a good time to have an incident, but it is clearly more damaging to the American basing 
presence when they occur in bunches. Tokyo’s 1989 political concession proves that a cluster 
of recent accidents can be exacerbated by a time of political vulnerability of national leaders, 
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creating strain between Japanese and American national leaders. Moreover, a crash that 
presents a multitude of crash factors will be politicized to higher levels when it occurs at a 
time of heightened Okinawan tension. 
3. Poor American Post-crash Public Relations 
Comparing aftermaths of the 2004 and 2013 accidents, American post-crash 
public relations contributed to two radically different outcomes. In 2004, a contentious 
crash was enflamed by a poor American public relations response. Controversy ensued 
over how the U.S. Marines secured the crash site immediately after the accident, 
prompting local residents to equate the Marine actions with an occupation mindset. The 
Marines coordinated their actions poorly with Okinawan agencies and the aftermath of 
the crash lacked the element of teamwork or interagency cooperation. Underlying affairs 
between the U.S. Marines and Okinawans was poor American public relations. 
Independent of whether or not the actions taken by the Marine forces were legitimate, 
their public statements were often tardy and inadequate. Instead of being proactive with 
press releases, the Marines performed damage control. Because of all these inflammatory 
factors, a massive rift developed between the American basing presence and the local 
populace. The Marines did not receive the benefit of doubt and miscommunications in the 
days following the accident furthered resentment. 
Nine years later, a less serious crash was contained by an effective U.S. Air Force 
public relations campaign. American forces learned from the 2004 debacle by providing 
timely and accurate information to the media. Essentially, the Air Force knew what 
information the Okinawans wanted to know about the crash and public affairs officers 
adeptly quelled the crisis. In the aftermath of the crash, the actions taken by the U.S. 
military were consistent with the information provided in press releases. The Marines 
agreed to postpone the arrival of the inbound MV-22 Osprey squadron and no significant 
mistakes were made to propel the incident into a crisis. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. PRE-MISHAP PLAN TRAINING 
This study also functions as a tool for guiding the development and execution of 
pre-mishap plan training. Referencing Table 1, many circumstances of a crash cannot be 
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controlled or mitigated. The three crash factors that the U.S. military has the ability to 
influence are post-crash public relations, crash-site management, and local interagency 
cooperation. If the goal is to stabilize base relations in Okinawa, then American military 
forces should prioritize effective public relations campaigns and interagency operations 
with local authorities. 
1. Post-crash Public Relations 
Since proper preparation is critical to conducting effective public relations, 
American forces should practice regular joint mishap training exercises and coordinate 
capabilities between joint public affairs offices. Referencing the comparative case study 
of 2004 and 2013 helicopter crashes, public relations play a significant role in either 
aggravating or suppressing an American incident. Okinawan anti-base movements are 
well-organized in regards to maintaining historical archives and their specialization of 
personnel; they have improved their effectiveness through the years, employing activists 
full-time to destabilize the American basing presence. Therefore, American forces should 
prioritize improving the organizational quality of their public relations offices. Joint 
mishap training exercises help American forces formulate a timely, appropriate response 
to U.S. military incidents. Inter-service cooperation is improved through the execution of 
joint drills, ensuring effective partnerships between the American services. By instilling a 
team approach to any U.S. military service incident, petty service rivalries will be 
avoided and resources consolidated toward effective mishap response. Many of these 
steps were taken following the 2004 crash and implemented with great success in 2013. 
Of course, American forces typically rotate their personnel in three-year cycles and each 
U.S. service should remain vigilant in preparation for the next incident. If the American 
public relations teams become complacent, their response to the next event could be 
lacking and inflammatory. 
An example of an effective and creative U.S. public response is Brigadier General 
Hecker’s 2013 letter to the Japanese people. He provided a safety overview of the 
accident, explained what actions the U.S. Air Force was taking to prevent another future 
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crash from occurring, and referred to the Okinawans as “good neighbors.”216 By 
connecting the squadron involved in the accident with the events of 3/11, he was able to 
connect the airmen in the crash on a human level with Okinawans. Hecker treated 
Okinawans with respect and gratitude. The actions taken by Hecker and other American 
leaders following the 2013 crash helped to satiate Okinawan demands for an account of 
the crash and minimize political activism. If the U.S. military follows Hecker’s example 
by providing accurate and relevant information to the public, greater trust and 
interagency cooperation will be built with Okinawan organizations. 
2. Crash-site Management 
American mishap response plans should involve coordinated action with 
Okinawan authorities to minimize the politicization of crash-site management. By 
training with Okinawan emergency responders, American forces can prevent a future 
controversy in the aftermath of an accident. The actions taken by the U.S. Marines in 
2004 at the Okinawa International University crash-site were misunderstood by many 
Okinawans, drawing comparisons to an American occupation. Marine maintenance 
workers responded bravely to the crash by pulling downed aircrew from the burning 
aircraft wreckage, securing the area, and ensuring local citizens were clear of the nearby 
administrative building. But the actions taken by the Marines to secure the crash-site 
were not appreciated by many of the local residents, leading to controversy and increased 
tensions. Although attempts were made by the Marines to incorporate local emergency 
responders with the crash-site management, anti-base activists politicized a lack of 
American cooperation with Okinawans. 
Following the 2004 crash, the U.S. military revamped protocols and emergency 
response plans in order to facilitate more effective operations with Okinawa agencies. In 
large part due to the 2013 crash being on base property, it did not carry with it 
controversy over the integration of emergency responders or a perceived security-
perimeter ordeal like in 2004. Indicative of effective partnerships, Okinawan fire and 
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rescue units volunteered to help in any capacity with the American effort to manage the 
crash-site at Camp Hansen. 
3. Local Interagency Cooperation 
This category is interconnected with post-crash public relations and crash-site 
management because it serves as another means for the American leaders to coordinate 
with Okinawans. With the goal of improving relations, American forces should integrate 
their emergency response plans with Okinawan agencies. The greater the cooperation and 
training between American forces and local institutions, the more likely that a future 
incident will be handled with cooperative efforts. American forces can build partnerships 
with Okinawan organizations (political leaders, media, fire, police, etc.) by remaining 
active with coordinated training exercises and conducting regular meetings with 
Okinawan leaders. If teamwork is emphasized, there will be less of an us-and-them 
component to the American basing presence, stabilizing relations. Furthermore, a greater 
team focus will promote more efficient joint relations between American services. 
Following the 2004 accident, Okinawan organizations began participating 
annually in a joint American-Okinawan aircraft mishap response drill. By the 2013 crash 
at Camp Hansen, a familiar relationship had been established between the U.S. military 
and Okinawan Fire and Rescue agencies. Within the last decade, the U.S. military has 
prioritized improved partnerships with local institutions, but these efforts must be 
sustained and adapted. This thesis underlines multiple cases of poor American 
coordination fueling crises and effective U.S. teamwork subduing the political impact of 
incidents. By and large, timely and accurate communication is a prerequisite for 
successful American cooperation with Okinawan agencies. Miscommunications and 
inconsistencies have sabotaged American damage control efforts. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research can inform a broader understanding of Okinawa and American base 
politics in general. It yields knowledge of anti-base movements, the politicization of 
aviation crashes, and the importance of effective public relations following an incident. 
This thesis also informs projects with a more narrow focus including individual bases and 
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specific aircraft. Whether the focus is on Japan or another country where the Americans 
have permanent military bases, this research can be applied to a multitude of military 
incidents. 
1. Broader Implications on Base Politics and Public Relations 
Crime, accidents, and pollution caused by service members destabilize American 
base politics, testing the partnership of the host nation and Washington. In response to 
these leadership challenges, the reaction of American commanders is significant because 
U.S. military actions can exacerbate a crisis by either offending the local residents or by 
communicating poorly with the public. Any incident or negative byproduct of the 
American basing presence can be politicized in a similar capacity as an aviation accident. 
Consequently, future research could use the template from this thesis to similarly 
evaluate the politicization of U.S. servicemen crime, non-aviation accidents, or pollution. 
A study of past crimes or incidents in Okinawa would yield further insight in improving 
public relations. Furthermore, these same principles could be applied in South Korea, 
Germany, or another American host nation. 
2. MCAS Futenma 
In the process of this analysis, it is clear that an accident involving Futenma or the 
U.S. Marine Corps will be more highly politicized than a crash involving a different 
American base or service. In the near future, a Futenma-based aircraft crashing into the 
township and killing civilians represents a worst-case scenario. A catalytic event 
involving Futenma risks undermining American base agreements with Japan. 
Additionally, anti-base Governor Onaga is liable to contribute to anti-base political 
mobilization. Debates have been 20 years in the making over when Futenma will be 
closed or if it should be closed, and the replacement facility is far from complete. There 
have been numerous aviation crashes through the years in Okinawa, but few have 
involved the controversial Marine base. In the meantime, Futenma remains operational, 
base leaders continue to take strides in minimizing threats to the local community, and 
infrastructure repairs are being performed to ensure safe operations. The U.S. Marines 
also work actively with the government of Japan and Okinawan leaders with the goal of 
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fostering effective partnerships. With Futenma a highly controversial base, future 
research could evaluate whether it makes more sense to permanently keep Futenma open 
or to continue construction on the fleet replacement facility. 
3. MV-22 Osprey 
Although Okinawan perceptions are mixed over the alleged unsafe nature of the 
MV-22 Ospreys, the aircraft bears numerous improvements over the one it replaced, the 
CH-46. Ospreys are able to climb to a higher altitude in reduced time, minimizing aircraft 
noise and providing a greater altitude sanctuary by the time it departs the airfield.217 The 
Osprey has the ability to fly as a helicopter or speedily depart as a conventional airplane, 
contributing to misconceptions about its reliability, but it has one of the strongest safety 
records in the U.S. Marine Corps.218 Because the MV-22 is a politically contentious 
airplane in Okinawa, an argument could be made that a crash involving this airplane will 
be politicized at a higher level than another aircraft. Evaluation of Okinawan perceptions 
of the MV-22 Osprey in comparison to the aircraft it replaced occurs as an area for 
potential future research. Another angle of research would involve determining if the 
MV-22 presents more or less of a threat to the township than helicopters like the CH-46. 
D. SUMMARY 
For 70 years, American military forces have sustained their presence in Okinawa 
because of effective partnership between Tokyo and Washington. Relations between the 
U.S. military and Okinawa are undermined by history, an anti-military culture, and 
animosity in the Okinawa-Tokyo-Washington relationship. Leading drivers in base 
politics are catalytic incidents, whether it is crime, accidents, environmental damage, or 
cultural insensitivity. Okinawan social activists are keen to exploit any American incident 
in order to receive financial compensation, a particular political concession, or the 
ultimate removal of American forces from their island. Forces that stabilize American 
basing operations include compensation politics, Tokyo’s strong security consensus, and 
                                                 




Okinawa’s weak government. The durability of Japan’s security consensus was detailed, 
highlighting Japanese political elites’ commitment to preserving the basing status quo. 
Okinawan political activists have achieved few political victories because of their 
inability to win-over the support of Tokyo’s elites. 
In order to predict the consequences of potential future scenarios, this study 
investigated why certain aviation accidents in Okinawa have been more politicized than 
others. With airplane crashes distinct, they are politicized to various levels by social 
activists. This research conducted case study analyses of individual crash factors to 
determine which features are more significant than others. Through this analysis, this 
study identifies which factors are most susceptible to politicization and which factors the 
American military presence has the ability to influence. Although there are many crash 
factors that are outside the U.S. military’s ability to control, the post-accident public 
affairs campaign plays a vital role in either enflaming or quelling a crisis. Therefore, 
American basing rights will be threatened by future incidents, but effective public 
relations quell crises and preserve support for American bases. 
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